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INTRODUCTIOl'f 
EYer since St. Anselm wrote the Proslosion. the argument 
tor the existence ot God therein contained bas been commented 
upon and disputed by both major and m1aor philosophera. So.e 
have brierly expressed their thoughts on it; others have written 
l.ngt~ monographs; tew completel,. ignore it. The many, varied 
op1n1ona expressed over the centuries may be .een in such histor-
ical studies as Augustinus Daniel's Ge_chioh'e der Gottesbewei.e 
!! Dreia.bat_a K~rhundtrt,l Geors Grunwald's Ge.chicht. ~ 
gotte.bewel.e !! H&~telalter,2 aDd Alvin Piantinsa·. recent !b! 
Ontolgsica~ ArSU'ent,3 which includes tbe comments of .odern and 
co.temporary philosophers. Books, artlcles, and pamphlets writ-
ten on the subject are numerous enough to torm a small library. 
The issues are clearly defined; the cups are set. ~,then, 
should more be written on the subject? 
Recently, Norman Malcolm ot Oornell University and Obarle. 
Hartshorne ot the University of Texas have raised the new issue 
ot bow many arguments there are. They both maintain that AD.elm 
lAugust1nus Daniels, O.S.B., "Qeschichte der Gottesbe-
welse 1m Dreizebnten Jahrhundert, It Bei traes! .I.!l£ Qeschichte der 
PhilosoRQ1! der Mittelalter (VIII, t-2; Muenstirz~cK.Daort1iCh. 
luchaverliiiidluult 19t59'. 
2Georg Grunwald, ~Geschicht. der Gottesbewe1se 1m M1ttel-
alter," Be&traese iurhGesCh!Chte der Pbilo8oph1e der Mittelalter (VI, 3; AUenater, sc enaorff8che-,ucfisverSan~lung, 1967'. 
3Alv1~ Planting., !h, Ontological Arsument (New York: Dou-
bleday. 1965). 
2 
has two argumen~8: one trom contingent existence and another trom 
necessary existence. According to them, it properly understood, 
the second argument does not exhibit the admitted weakness of 
the first. The purpose ot this paper 1s to investlgate this nev 
issue concerning the number of arguments and to give a critique 
at the views ot Malcolm and Hartshorne on the validity of what 
they consider is a second argument. In conformity with this pur-
pose, the author, while realislng the vast literature on the 
Anselmian argument, limits himself chiefly to the writings ot 
Anselm, Malcolm, Hartshorne, and the current critiques ot the 
latter ments positions. The procedure is to give an exposition 
ot the foundations ot the argument in the writings ot St. Anselm, 
the arguBlent itselt, the argumentation ot Malcol. and Hartshorne, 
and tinally a critique ot their positions. 
CHAPTER I 
FOUNDATIONS O.F THE AN!3.ELMIAN AHGUMENT 
IN AN3EUi'S WRITINGS 
Charle. Hartshorne asks what Anselm .eant by "greatness" 
in the famous formula, "a being, than whioh nothing greater can 
be thought," which appears in the second chapter ot the Pro!lo-
g10n. l !his specitic question should be placed in the larger 
context of the aeaning ot the entire formula. In Anselm's Mono-
.r 
12810n the answers to the spec1fic question and the question of 
the meaning of the whole formula can be tound. Why An.ela torrau-
lated his idea of God the way he did is partial17 due to his coS-
nitional theory. It is said that Ansel.'s theor,J ot truth 18 the 
hidden nerve running through the argumentation 1n the Mono!osioD 
and Proslogion2 and that his cognitional theory provides a foun-
dation tor his entire thougbt. 3 Both Ans.lats cognitional theor, 
and Monologlo~, then, require investigation as propaedeutic to 
the argument in the ProsloSion. 
lObarles Hartsborne, The ~ ~t Pertection and Other 
i8!!ls in Neoclassioal MetapPjii~iilie, !l!Inolsr-open 
ao~. I96~', p. 35. 
2Etienne Gilson and Phl10theua Boehner, aeschichte der 
Ohristlionen Philo.oph1a (2d eel. rav.; 1?aderborzu FeraInanr-
nchoenIDih. 19$~'. II, p. 299. 
3Robert 1111ler, a.S.B., "!he Ontologionl A.rgument in St. 
Anselm and Descartes," ~ Modern Schoolman, XXXII (May. 1955), 
p. 345. 3 
4 
Since Anselm did not write a comprehensive treatise on 
cognit:i.on, his eognitional tlv:~ory !!lust be culled from his R!. !.!!£-
itate and trom snatches of his other writings. The DeVerltate 
-
is a dialogue between Anselm and one of his students on the topiC 
ot "what truth ls, and of what things it is ordinarily predi-
cated, and what justice 18.,,4 Anselm's student was puzzled by 
his statement in the Monolo5io~ that truth d06S not have either 
a beginning or an end and that tt 'nothing can be true without 
truth. • t.5 Sinoe God is truth and every true thing is a partici-
patlon in truth, the student wishes to know whether or not God 
is the truth or every true thing or statement. This leads to 
the question of what truth 1s. 
Anselm d08S not answer immediately. Slowly he proceeds 
to formulate a suitable definition, beginning with an inquiry 
into the truth Qf statements, proceeding to the truth ot opinion, 
the will. natural and unnatural actions, the senses, the essenoes 
ot things, and tinally the definition itself. 
Statements are true in two ways: by nature, by both nature 
and an actual affirmation that something that is, is, or that 
something that is not, is not. Each coherent statement has its 
truth. its signification, regardless ot whether or not the sig-
nification correotly reters to the condition ot what i9 8i8ni-
• 
4Anselm, "De Ver1tate." Selections trom Medieval Philoso-
abers. ed. and triiis~ IIchard Moleon (New 'fori: '*enarIii ~crlY;:: 
ner'. Sons. 1929), It 150. further quotationa are from this 
translation. 
5 ~ •• p. 152. 
5 
tied. Thus, the statement "it is raining" has a true meaning. 
As S\. statement it can be understood. by anyone cognizant ot Ehg-
lisb who has lived, 1s now living, or will live. Such a truth 
is natural. In this sense even a. 11e is true. Whether the 
statement correctly reters to the presence of rain drops actuall7 
taIling at the same time the utterance is made, is another ques-
tion. 
Ansela's student, who holds that the thing stated 1s the 
cause ,of a true statement, supposes that truth is found only in 
statements. Anselm, however, argues to a de.per meaning of truth 
than natural truth. Bis dialectical progression is here quoted, 
because it introduces a key Dotion in Anselm's doctrine of truth 
and in his philosophy 8S a whole. 
£ist. What then does truth in state.ent seem to you to be? 
".se. I know nothing other than that when it signifies that 
that whloh is ls, then truth is in it, and it 18 true. 
to what end is an f.l.ffirmation made? ;s~. 
ac. 
~. 
mac. 
Fliii. 
-
to signity that that which is ia. 
Then it should d.o that? 
Certainly. 
Then when it signifies thst that which ls ls, it sig-
nifies as lt should? Btii. That is clear. 
s • But when it signifies as it should it signifies right-
ly? 
~. !hilt 1s so. 
~. HoweTer, when it signities rightly, the significat10n 
1s right? 
Disc. There 18 no doubt of that. 
5.'6. fteretore, when it signifies tb.at that whioh is is, 
the s1pitioatlon 18 ri.ght? 
~Si. That tollows. 
--!-. Likewise when it signifies that that which is is, the 
Signification is true? 
Dlsq. Yes, it i8 both right and true, when it signifies that 
that which is is. 
Mast. 
Disc. 
Sst. 
-
Disc. 
-
6 
It is the same, therefore, for the affirmation to be 
right and true, that is, to signify that that which 1s 
1s? 
Yes, it is the same. 
Consequently, truth, for it, is not other than right-
ness. 6 
I see clearly now that truth is this rightness. 
Rightness or rectitude 1s the major criterion tor the truth ot a 
statement. In the conformity ot a statement to the objective 
reality of the thing signified lies the truth ot the statement. 
Though all coherent statements are naturally true, they may be 
both true and right it they affirm and deny what they ought to. 
According to nature, a statement is always true; according to 
use, it may be either true or talse, according to whether or not 
it signifies what it was made to Signify; namely, that what is 
is and what 1s not 1s not. These truths are separable and there-
fore d1tterent. The double rectitude mayor may not be there. 
Yet in some instances, such as in the statements "Man 1s an ani-
mal tt or "Man is not a stone," 7 the double truth is &lv83'S had, 
because they always actually slgnify what they are made to slg-
niry. What applies to verbal communioation applies to all torma 
of communication which use signs "tor si.gnity'ing that something 
1s or is not. H8 
Truth is also said to be in the area ot thought and opin-
ion. Anselm's argumentation 1s brief. 'I'be reason lIan has the 
6 ~., pp. 153-154. 
7 Ibid., p. 155. 
8 Ibid., p. 156. 
? 
power to think is to enable him to think that what is is and what 
is not is not, which means to think as he ought. Again rightness 
is the key note. When a thought corresponds to reality and real-
ity exists in the manner it is thought to exist, the thought i8 
tl'UG, tor ttthere is no other truth or thought than rightness. ,,9 
It is also said that the will is true. Anselm investi-
gates the truth ot the will, finding the familiar solution. In 
the will, truth is "nothing exoept rightness."lO Both angels 
and men were given wills to be used tor willing what they should. 
Satan and his followers abandoned truth and rightness only when 
they willed what they should not have willed. 
Moreover, aotions bave truth. Arguing trom Scripture 
Anselm affirms that doing good is the same as doing the true. 
But. aocording to the opinion or all men, he who does good and 
acts truly also does as he should. Aoting as he should. he acts 
rightly, "wheretore nothing is more apparent than that the truth 
of action is rightness."ll Actions. however, may be either de-
termined or undetermined by nature. Those proceeding trom the 
intellect and will are naturally undetermined. because they may 
or may not be done the way they should; whereas involuntary acts, 
such as the warming of tire. are necessarily determined by the 
nature of the agent. 
9 ~ •• p. 157. 
lOIbid. 
llIbid •• p. 158. 
8 
Similarly there is determined and undetermined truth in 
sensation. The senses seem to deceive us otten. They report, 
tor instance, that a mants tace is in a mirror, even though be 
knows hin race remains with himself, and that a straight rod 1s 
crooked when placed in water. Anselm distinguishes sense impres-
sions from the interpretation ot them, maintaining that the sen-
ses report what they are by nature made to report, do what they 
should, and have both truth and rightness. Error creeps in when 
the mind improperly judges the truth presented by the sense or-
gans. 
Anselm·s treatment ot sensation and the genesiS ot an idea 
as a whole require further elucidation. A man senses, because 
he bas a body; a man has ideas partly because he has a body, 
partly because he has a soul. 
Not restricted to anyone part ot the body, the soul per-
meates, suffuses, and enlivens the whole body, being entirely 
i tael! in the whole as well as in all of the pa.rts. "For, it 
the soul were not as a whole in tho separate members ot the body, 
it would not fe;~l as a whole in the separate members. 1112 ~e 
soul baa several aspects--intellect and will--which, on account 
ot their not being coextensive with it and their having special 
activities, are dirferent trom it.13 Both the intellect and will 
12Anselm, tfProslofion," ch. 13. St. Anselm, ed .. and trans. 
Sidney Deane (2d ed.; C~cago: Open Court. 193$), p. 20. All 
fUrther English quotations are taken trom this edition, unless 
otherwise noted. 
l3Anselm, "De concordia Rraesclentiae ~. ~raedestinatlonlJ~ 
.!1 g;-atiae ~ SJ!a'"Tl'6ero aroltrlo." oK. It. vpera Omnl.9. 2. Aq-
9 
are likened to instruments; the one being used for reasoning, 
the other, for willing. In both eases a distinction ie made be-
tween the power and. its act t the instrument and 1 ts use. In the 
will there is also distinguished the affections tor happiness 
and rightness. forces and inclinations by which the '1il1 spon-
taneously moves itself and in turn moves the other powers in-
volved in tree. volunta.ry aots. 
A man has both sensual and oogn.i tional knowledge or the 
world.14 He i3 affected by particular corporeal objects in the 
world around. him. From the rea.ction of his rive sense organs to 
the impulses trom the sensible object an interior oorporeal image 
is tormed in the body. Purthermore a spiritual image or word 1. 
tormed in the intellect, tor "to think or an object ••• is to ex-
prese it mentally."15 The one is not the other. The phantasm 
is restricted to a particular sensible object: whereas the intel-
lectual iaage grasps the universal. "I express a man in one 
--
\-Jay ••• through the image ot his body, when the mind ima.gines his 
visible torm; through the reason, however, when it thinks ot his 
universal essence, whioh is rational, mortal anlmal.,,16 Whereas 
the mind may miSinterpret the reports at the senses, the senses 
881m1, 00. J'rancis f'-,obmitt, 0.3.:8. (6 vola.; Vol. I; Sekau: AbbE!' 
Piess, 1939; Vola. II-VI; Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 19l46-61). II, 
p. 279, 11. 4-6. All Latin quotations are trom this edition. 
1~onolog1on, ch. 1, p. 38. 
l5Ibid., ch. 48, p. 112. 
16Ib~4.' ch. 10, p. 57. 
10 
always report correctly. A mistake in the process of sensation 
is "not the fault of the senses, which report what thoy are able 
to, (since they were given just this potency), but it must be 
imput.d to the judgment ot the mind, which does not distinguish 
clea.r1,. what they can or what they ought to do.,,17 Moreover, 
knowledge ot the world is gained only through the medium of the 
senses and phanta.sm: lithe artisan is wholly unable to concei va 
in his imagination any bodily thing, except what be has in 80ae 
way learned trom external objects, whether all at once, or by 
part. n18 
Besides knowing the world, a man can reflect upon and 
know himself. Just as a person can passively know many things 
without actually thinking about them, so too does he have an 
awareness, a consciousness ot him.e1f, even though he may not 
actually have his soul as an object of reflection. "The human 
mind is not always thinking ot itself, thougb it ever remembers 
itselr.»19 !his ••• ory ot itself, moreover, is the condition 
for the reflexive act; tor 'fit is clear that, when it thinks ot 
itselt, the word oorresponding to it is born of memory.»20 In 
reflecting upon itself the soul forms within itself an image or 
itself by speaking itself as an interior word. Between this word 
b I •• F *---.,... ...,. 
l7~ !!rl~~~!, ch. 6, McKeon, ~. g!!., p. 162. 
l~ono~2S1oq, ch. 11, p. 58. 
19Ib1d., ch. 48, p. 112. 
-2OIbid• 
I 
11 
and the soul only a rational distinction exists. "The rational 
mind, then, when it conceives of itself in thought, has with 
itself its image born of itself' ••• altbough it can.Dot, except in 
thought alone, separate itself trom its image, which is its 
word.,,2l 
A third source of knowledge is the light of truth, which 
illumines aankil.ld and "trom. which shines every truth that gives 
light to the rational mind."22 The light is far too bright for 
Anstillll to see and yet he sees nothing except through it just "as 
tho weak eye aees what it see. through the ligbt ot the sun, 
which 1n the sun itself it cannot look upon.,,23 It is the splen-
dor ot the Lord ~hich is wholly present, in which Anselm moves 
and has hi~ being. This much Anselm says, but just ex~ctly what 
he means is ambiguous. Do.at de Varges, tor instance, maintains 
that the light of truth 1s the agent intellect;24 whereas Flsch.~ 
believes that it i6 a metaphorical expression tor the first prin-
ciples in so tar as they are grasped as reflections of the divine 
light. 25 
Now that the sources of human knowledge have been consi-
dored, the investigation into truth may be continued. Truth 1s 
• T. F ...... _ It _ •• _------.. 
21Ibld., ch. 33. p. 97. 
22 Proalosion, ah. 14, p. 21. 
23Ibld •• ah. 16, p. 22. 
24Domet de Vorges, Saint 4nse11.l1e (PariS: Felix Aloun, 
19(1), p. 106. 
25Ft.oher, If Die Erkenntnls1ehre Anselma Von Canterb!!fi' It 
Beitraege zur a..ohIent' aer PhilosopHie des Mi~lil~era, ,3; 
AU.nster i:-V: Iscnen!orf?iChe Verlag8DuoEiin!IUigt~91r), p. 48. 
12 
also predicated ot the essences ot things. Wherein does the 
truth ot essences 11e1 In the conformity ot what they ought to 
be with what they are. God is truth; there is nothiT'g, be it in 
any place at any time, that is not related to this highest truth 
nor that 1s able to be anything else than what 1t is. "~thatAo­
ever 1s, therefore, is truly, in so far as it is what it is 1n 
the supreme truth. w26 Essences are true because they correspond 
to the divine idea of what they should be. Anselm .eems ·to indi-
cate that truth 1s had onll in the oontext ot real existence. 
AccordlD.8 to hill, "that which is falsely 1s not. tt27 Since what-
is exists in aocorda,'lce to the .11 vine mind, it 18 as it should 
be. Being as it should be, it rightly is what it is. It fol-
lows, then, that trutb and rightness are in the essence of 
things; "it 1s certain, that the truth of things is righ-tness. tt28 
From his investigation ot where truth is said to be found, 
Anselm concludes that truth or rightness is primarily the supreme 
Truth. All other truths are true in Virtu. of the supreme Truth. 
They are what they ought to be or do what they ought to do be-
cUllse th8y are OI' act in accordance with divine Truth. Such is 
not tho case for diville Itruth. It is what it is solely because 
it 1s. It is completely independent, dependent upon nothing. 
Exclusive ot the diviDe fruth, some truths are causes: 
26R! Veritate, en. 7, p. 163. 
27Ib1d• 
28Ibi~ •• p. 164. 
13 
others, both effects and causes: ettects in that they are caused 
by God, the cause of all truth; causes in that they in turn cause 
the truth of thoughts and statements. "T.be truth which is in 
the existence ot things ••• is also cause itselt of the tr~th wh1cb 
is thought and that which 1s in a propOSition; and these two 
latter are the cause of no truth."29 
Anselm has shown the rightness ot statements, thoughts, 
actions, essences, and sensation. The only rightness not as yet 
considered is the rightness of corporeal things, such as the 
rightness or straightness of a pole. The common notion in the 
truth ot statements, thoughts, actions, essences, sensation, and 
corporeal things, is rightness. Is there any way ot distinguish-
ing their rightness? The former rightnesses of statements and 
so forth are conceive~ by the mind alone; whereas the latter (the 
rightness ot corporeal things) is perceived by both the senses 
and the mind. Truth, in the strict sense, Anselm limits to the 
tormer, defining it as "rightness perceptible to the mind 
alon8."'O 
!ruth has three characteristics; it 1s eternal, unchange-
able, and one. Upon the first characteristic a proof tor the 
existence of God can be based.31 That truth is not eternal is a 
contradictory notion. If someone were to say there was a time 
St. 
-
29~.t p. 170. 
30Ibid., ch. 11, p. 172. 
31Alexandre Koyre, L·Id~. de Dleu dans 1& Phi1~soph1e ~ 
Anselme (Paris: Ernst teroux,-r9~ p. 9J. 
14 
when there was no truth or that there will be a time when there 
will bft no truth, he would have to affirm the statement that 
truth is not eterna.l. But then, this statement would be true 
even when truth 1s not supposed to exist or have existed. The 
contradiotion is obvious. Since men make true statements, truth 
is eternal; since God is the source ot truth, He must exist and 
eternally exist. 32 
Since truth is eternal, it must also be unchangeable. 
8o~ething is true, when it is right or has rightness. Either 
the rightness varies or it does l:ot vary. It it varies, it 
varies according to the things themselves. One proper example 
is adequate tor elucidating all instances. A statement is right 
when it says what it ought to say; namely, that what is is and 
what is not is not. Without this rightness, a statement oannot 
be right. If rightness were dependent upon the statement, right-
ness would vary as statements vary; and when a state.ment is 
false or not made, rightness would not exist. But, when a state-
mont is talse, it is no less right that the statement should have 
expressed what it ought to have expresaed. Rightness is the nOrD 
according to which a statement is true or talse. When a state-
ment is not made, it is no leAS true that, it it were made, it 
should be made rightly. Therefore rightness eXists, even though 
the statement does not exist. Even atter a statement is made, 
the rightness by which it was right or should have been right 
32R! Veritate, ch. 10, p. 170. 
1; 
does not perish. "The rightness ther':3'tore by which signification 
in called right does not acquire being, or a.n:J' change, through 
alg.nlticatioD, however the signification itself may be change~~3 
Since truth is botlI eternal and unchangeable , it 1s invar-
iable, it is one. That Anaelul has considered the truth in state-
monts. thoughts, essences, and so forth, allot which are difter-
ent trom one another is no objection to the unity ot truth; for 
truth is improperly said to be ot this or that thing, 
since truth does not have its being in things, or out 
of' things, or 'because ot things in which it is said to 
be, but when things are according to that which 1s always 
present in those things which are as they should be, then 
the truth ot this or that thin! is spoken ot ••• the supreme 
truth subsisting in itself 1s the truth ot no thing, but 
when something 1s according to truth, then it is called 
the truth o.r the rightness of that thIng. ~ 
God is supreme Truth. Truth is one, immutable, eternal, and per-
ceptible to the mind alone. It is independent altha things ot 
which it is predicatGd. These same ideas run through the proofs 
tor the existence of God in the Monologion. 
All tour~5 ot the Mono1ogion prooto go trom the sensible 
world to the first cause or exemplar of the world. Men experi-
ence good things in this world with both their bodily senses and 
intellectual faculties. The question arises as to whether these 
desired goods a.re good through one thing or several thint}s. All 
3}Ibid., ch. 13. p. 182. 
-34-Ibid •• pp. 183-84. 
35Th• number or arguments is disputed. The common count 
is tour; e.g •• P. V1gnaux. "Sens et Structure du Monologion,lf 
Revue des Sciences PhilosoEhIgues-et !5eolosIgUis, Xf!I, p. 199. 
!oyre idle an argument from beauE7;-SR. 2!!., p. 37. 
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goods can be compared with one another. In oomparison, the good. 
are either equal or unequal, either they are good in the same 
measure o.r else 80me are better or less good than the others. 
But the oomparison, to be valid, can depend upon only one criter-
ion or standard for allot the compared goods. The standard can-
not be different in one thing a.nd ill another. One may not decide 
one man 1s more just tha.n another, Uexcept through the quality 
of .i»stness. whioh is not one thing in one substanoe. and another 
in another.,,36 Though justioe is a quality predicated of onlT 
80me beings, goodness 1& not; it can be predicated in greater or 
lesser degree of .ve~hing. In each case, the criterion must 
be the same, ulthougb. sowetimes a thing appears to be good for 
different reasons. ~AUS a horse may be termed good, beoause it 
is swift and strong, neither of which qualities seems ~o be the 
flue. But swiftness a.ud strength cannot be the basis of good-
ness, because these same qua.lit1~.Hi w.". said to make a. thief bad. 
!rhe qual1ties themselves are good, bow they are el£.ployed accounts 
for their being called sood or bad in different oircumstances. 
In general. things are called good because they arb either useful 
or have some noble quality. Whatever is usetul or noble, howevez 
if it be truly good, is good through that bemg "through which 
it 1s necessary that everything, whatever it may be, is gOOd_,,37 
______________________ 11_._ .. ______ ._. ___ .,.... ........... ",........ ........ ......., .... 
3~nolos1o~. ch. 1. p. 39. 
37Authorts translation. On account ot the context he in-
terprets l/(per idipaum esse bona) per quod neoesse est esse OUlle-
ta bona, qu1dquid ll1ud sit." Monol~s1o!!, ch. 1, Schmitt, I, p. 
15, 11. 2-" ditferently from Diane's translation: "tbrough 
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Since it is tho basis upon ,.,.hioh evm:-,.thlng i8 termed good, this 
being cannot but be the gl~ateRt good. Moreover, aUlee the les-
ser goO<.is do not have goodness ot thAm8&1 vea (otherwise goodne •• 
\fould be one thins in onf't being and I'someth;ing els8 in another) t 
t~hey must receive or l'mrtake- in the common source ot goodness, 
uhioh is the one, the supreme good, which alone 1s good through 
itself. Surpassing all other be1n~ it is both supremely good 
and great. Nothing surpasses no~ equals it in goodness or £reat-
ness, not physical greatness but that depending upon worthiness, 
11ke wisdom. Supreme goodness and sreatness imply each other. 
"And since there oan be nothing supremAly great Axcept wha.t is 
£3upremely good, there JIlUst be B being that in greatest and best. 
i.e., th. highest of all be1ngs."38 
ADs_1m has argued from goodntHUJ and greatness in beings 
to one greatest and baet being. Be continues by arguing trom 
existence an~ degree8 or dignity in beings. Whatever eXists, 
exists through itselt or -through another or through mutual causal 
1ntlu4nce. It is Dot 10g1cal to imagine that a being exists 
through the very being upon which it confers existence; so this 
alto:t"1lat1ve ilt eliminated. More than one thing cannot exist 
tbrough itself .. beoause it they were to exist through themselves, 
they would be equal :In this respect. :aut to be eqUAl 1 t 1s nee •• 10 
BarT that there be one power or nature or existing "througb it-
which all goods exist, whatever that being 1s," p. 40. Cf. 
Xoyre, sm., c.:~~., p. 39. 
~onolosion, ch. 1, p. 40. 
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se1t" by which the7 exist. There can be, then. but one being 
who exists through itself and through which all other existents 
oxist. "one being which alone exists in the greatest an1 higbest 
degree of 811."39 
Furthermore, there are in tbeworld natures of dIverse 
dignity. A horae is better thall a log and a man better than a 
horse. But the ladder cannot rise forever, 80 there must be one 
bisheat nature or ODe highest olass. It they form a class, the7 
are equal. It they are equal. th&y are so through one cause 
which is either themselves or something else. If it is something 
else. it is something at a superior nature; hence, they oould Dot 
form a highest class. If it is themselves, it is their esaence. 
But, then, they oan have oAly one essence and one natul'iI t nature 
aod 8£S8»oe being identified here. Anselm's resounding conclu-
sion to theae arguments 1s that there is: 
a certain Nature, or Substanoe, or Essence, whioh is 
through i teel r good and great and through i taelf' is what 
it is; and through which exists whatever 1s 'truly good, 
or great, or has any existence at all; and which is the 
supreme good being, the supreme great being, being or 
subsisting a8 supreme, that is, the highest or all 8xis-
t1ns beings. 40 
Just as all things which exitit exist through the supreme 
Being, so too do they exist trom it; because the two modes ot 
expression may be interchanged now with the same meaning, now 
with another. !he question remains how the supreme Being exists 
39~.t ch. " p. 42. 
401914., ch. 4, p. 45. 
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thrOugh itself, aince tbe expression "esse per" usuall,. suggests 
an efficient, material, or instrumental cause. Can the supreme 
Being be any of these causes in regard to its existence? Cer-
tainly not, because these causes are prior to the effect. are 
greater in 80m. sense than the effect, and rule out independence. 
Nor can the supreme Being exist through or from. nothing. Exis-
tence through and from itself can be compared to a lighted light. 
The mutual relations ot the light and the verb lito light" and the 
partiCiple "luoent" are like the relations of essence, esse, and 
bein8.41 
Jaeumker42 and J18chor43 maintain that the above proofs 
exclude causality; whereas Adlhoch44 holds that they are causal 
arguments and Dollot de Vors •• 45 coapares them to th.e causal 
proofs in St. Tho.as. !he issue bere is whether or not Anselm 
i8 .erely dealing with concepts. It appears that, siDee he de-
velops his notion of God from things in the world and concludes 
to an unca.used cause. the second opinion is the stronger. 
After establishing that the Supreme Being exists through 
----------.----------_.--------------------------------.------------41~i~., ab. 6, p. 49_ 
42C1 ••• Ds Baeumker, "Witalo, Bin Phi1oso2b und Naturtor-
scher deS IIAI. Jahrhunderts, If BaitI'me aux' ~.cbI01ite aer Ph1l-
oaoph1e-!ea tt.li1ters (tIl, 2, Hueniter-r. w.: lschendort-
lea lien verrags5ucfil1an<tlun~h 1908). p. 295. 
4;gischer, ii- git., p. 37. 
"B. Adinocn, "Del' Gotte.bewe1s des hei1igen Ansel.," 
~1loso2hiscbe~ ~~r~~ch (X.4, 1897), p. 270 t. 
4'nomet de Vorges, ~. ~ •• pp. 233-38. 
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itself and all other things exist through it, Anselm investigate8 
its properties. He proceeds by eliminating whatever it is better 
not to be than to be. First of all, no relative exprftssion sig-
nifies God's essenoe. To aay that Be 18 the highest of all be-
inss, or greater than those which have bean created by Him is not 
to give an essential description of God. If no othar beings ex-
isted with which He cou.ld be compared, IIe oould not be re!'erl'~d 
to a8 "greater than" or "the highest." Since lie 1& wbat fie is 
througb HaBel! and other things ue what they &1"'& through !Ia. 
lie is actually no less great even thougb there are no other crea-
tures witb which He may be coapared. ~~'heth • .r!Ie is termed "su-
premo" or not makes no dift&rence; theref'ore, the L.ame is not 
ea~ent1al to llis description. filis same reasoning applies to 
all similar relative exprossions. By themselves, they cannot 
describe God. 
!he non-relative expressions aI'& conveniently divided in-
to those things, which, considered separately, it is b6tt~r to be 
than not to be t an;l thooe wbich it is not better to be tban to 
be. In general, to be something is better than not be be 60m6-
thing; bu.t th,n'e are some perfections which are good in 80me e1r-
Cum8t~lC.8 and bad in others. To be gold, for example, in bette! 
than to be lead; to be an anilA&l 1s better tbaL. to be a plant or 
a stone. to be a man is better tban to be merel¥ an animal. for 
a piece of lead to be turned into gold could well b. a 8004; but 
tor a man to be turned into lold like King ltidas would oertainl,. 
be a catastrophe or the first rank. Such p$rtections, then, 
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since they depend upon special circumstances tor being good, can-
not apply directly to God's essence. 
Other perrections are good without qualification. Wher-
ever they are, they are good; wherever they are absent, some per-
tection is missing. Wisdom and justness are two examples ot this 
tne. To be wise is always better than not to be wise, to be 
just i8 alwa,'s better than not to be just. Other example. are 
truth, blessedness, power, and eternity. These names can be and 
should be attributed directly to God. "Bence, the Being must be 
living, wise, powerful, and all-powerful, true, just, blessed, 
eternal, and whatever, in like manner, is absolutel,. better than 
what is not it. u46 
Even these terms .eem to have relative aspects. .or in-
stanc., to say that God is true or just se.ms to imply quantity 
or quality, that is, accidents which are distinct trom His es-
sence; because so.ething can be true and just only through truth 
and justness. The participant i8 what 1 t i8 through another, the 
partioipated. The partiCipated i8 not the partiCipant; the par-
ticipant is not the participated. But this distinction oannot 
apply to God. As was proTed abov., the supre •• Being can be 
through nothing else than Blmselt. !he only possible conclusion 
i8 that, in reterenoe to God, absolute pertectlons, no matter 
whether they are predicated as adjeotives or nouns, mean the s ... 
thins. Be is true, Be 1s truth; ae i8 just, He is justioe. 
~onOloSion, cb. 15, p. 64. 
22 
uNotb1ng that 1£1 truly said ot the supreme Being is accepted in 
terms ot quality or quant1ty, but only in terms ot what it 18._ 47 
Although many names are applied to tbe supreme Being, and 
designate His essence, ae is not composed ot many, d1tterent 
tbin;;s. In Him there can be no composition. otherwise lie would 
depend upon sometbing outside of Himselt as an etficient and/or 
mater1al cause. But, as was proved aboTe, He exists through Him-
selt, depending upon nothing else tor His existence. God is a 
single, simple being described by means ot a pluralit7 or names. 
Just as the divine simplicity excludes all composition, 
so too does it exclude any accidents, properly so-called. B.y 
definition, an accident 1s something which comes and goes trom a 
being, causing some change in it. The divine being, however, 
does not undergo change in a.ny torm. It is eternal, immutable. 
If it were not eternal, it would have a beginning and/or an end. 
It it had a beginning, it would derive its existence trom anoth.~ 
or trom nothing. Since nothing can come trom nothing, it could 
not have had a beginning trom nothing. Since it would be a con-
tradiction to maintain that the supreme BeIng exists through any-
thing but ltselt, it could not have bad a beginning trom so •• -
thing else. It it had an end, it would be corruptibl., able to 
be broken into parts. Since it is simple, it cannot be broken 
into parts; and bence, it has no ending. FUrthermore, on account 
or its simplicity, it cannot be the material cause ot anytbing.48 
47Ibid., ch. 17, p. 67. 
48Ibid., cb. 7. p. 51. 
23 
~t and it alone exists through itself, all other things exist 
~hrough it by creation and conservation. Therefore. wherever and 
~henever anything is, there and then it is. Besides being every-
~here at every time, it goes be70nd the dimensions of space and 
~ime, "for place and time themselves are existing thingS,H49 crea-
~ed by it; so that it is unlimited and eternal. 
The names "lite" a.nd "eternal" are of special interest :tOl 
~he topic of this paper, because both life and eternity imply tor 
~nselm necessary existence. The eternal being has no beginning, 
nor end, nor time, whether it be past, present, or future, con-
~idered as the transient time of men. The bein~ who is life pos-
~easee the fullness of life. No cause either brings it about or 
~erminates it. The supreme Being is said to be eternal or to 
~xist torever and "since for it, it is the same to exist and to 
4iV8, no better sense can be attached to this statement, than 
that it exists or lives eternally, that is, it possesses intermin-
!ble life, as a perfect whole at once.,,50 
Moreover, when be inquires into whether God can be oalled 
! substance, Anselm maintains that the term suits God in a quali-
ried way. An ordinary substance 1s affected by accidents, under-
~oing changes for which composition of substance and accidents is 
49 Ibid., ch. 20, p. 73. 
50Ibid., ch. 24, p. 83. The Latin text reads: "Quonlam 
dem est irrr-esse et vivere, nihil melius intel11gitur quamae-
terne esse vel vivere, id est interminabilem vitam perfecta simul 
~otam obtinere," Schmitt, I, p. 42, 11. 18-20. Compare with Boe-
~hius' definition of eternity in De Consolatione Philosophiae, V, 
~ -p.: n. 1. 63, 858 A. 
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~equired. God is both simple and immutable. The only way the 
~erm can apply is if substance is used for being and so traos-
pands all substances. 5l When distinguishing between God and 
~verything that is not God, Anselm uses absolute, perfect exis-
~ence over against highly imperfect existence. God and God alone 
~xists simply, perfectly, and absolutely; all other things are as 
pon-existent in comparison with Him.52 That which exists simply 
~d in the highest degree of all seems to have, and can have, no 
pther existence than necessary existence. 
When all the names are put together, God is described as: 
supreme Being, supreme Justness, supreme Wisdom, supreme 
Truth, supreme Goodness, supreme Greatness, supreme Beau-
ty, supreme Immortality, supreme Incorruptibility, supreme 
Immutability, supreme Blessedness, supreme Eternity, su-
preme Power, supreme Unity; which is nothing else than 
supremely being, supremely living, etc. 53 
51The Latin text reads: "nisi dicatur substantia pro es-
eentia. et sic sit extra. sicut est supra omnern aubstantiam,tI 
Schmitt, Monologion, ch. 36, I, ~. 44, 11. 10-11. Deane trans-
lates essentia as "being~ (p. 86), and not without reason; for in 
earlier passages Anselm equates existens with subsistens and es-
~entia with esse and. ens. ttQuemadiiodum. enim esse habent ad iiivi-
aem lux et lucere et lucens, sic sunt ad se invicem essentia at 
ease et ens, hoc est existens siva subsistens.Ergo sumroa eS3en-
tia et summa esse at summa ens, id est summa exist ens sive summe 
Bubsistena,!1 Monologion, ch. 6, Schmitt, I., p. 20, 11. 15-18. 
~Quonlam tamen ipsa non solum eertissime exist1t, sed etiam summe 
pmnium existit. et euius1ibet rei essentia diei eolat substantia: 
~rotecto si quid digne diei poteat, non prohibetur dic1 substan-
~1a," Monologion, ch. 28, Schmitt, I, :t>. 45, 11. 13-15. 
52MonoloSion, ch. 26, p. 86. 
53The Latin text is more inclusive, reading: "Summa essen .. 
~la, summa Vita, summa ratiO, summa iustltla ••• summe ens, summe 
~lve!ls, at alia similiter," Monolosion, ch. 16, Schmitt, I, p. 31, 
~1. 4-8; Deane, p. 66. 
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All of theae names are contained in the simple formula "a being 
a f.;reater than which cannot be thought. tt But evgn more is im-
plied in itt because whatever' men use to name God t they use im-
properly. Men have only analogical knowledge of God. The names 
are derived from experience of the tinite world. Hence. both 
creatures and God share the same name; yet, in the case of God 
the name has a very different Signification. 54 God transcends 
men's knowledge just as He transcends all substances. God, An-
selm realizes, is actually in this sense, "a being 8reater than 
cnn be conceived ... 55 
.------... -~ ... .. ,.- , .. .. . 
-
54F1qno1031on, ab. 26, p. 86. 
55Pr 1 . ;;. os O?l:l.OD, ah. 15. p. 22. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ANaELMIAN AHGUM.b:NT AND THE OO.NTROVERSY 
BETWEEN GATJNILO AND ANSELM 
The argument is found in the second and third chapters ot 
the Pr08logio~, in which Anselm writes: 
And 80 Lord. do thou, who dost give understanding to 
faith, give me, so tar as thou know.st it to be profitable, 
to understand that thou art as we believe; and that thou art 
that which we believe. And, indeed, we believe that thou 
art a being than which nothing greater can be oonceived. 
Or is there no auoh nature, sinoe the tool hath said in his 
heart, there 1s no God? (Psalm. xiv. I). But, at any rate, 
this very tool, when he hears of this being ot whioh I speak--
a being than whioh nothing greater can be conceived--under-
stands what he hears, and wbat he understands i8 in his und.~· 
atandlng, although he does not understand 1t to exist. 
For, it is one thing tor an ob~ect to be in the under-
standing, and another to understand that the object exists. 
When a painter first conceive8 ot what he will atterward8 
pertorm, he has it in his understanding, but he does not 7et 
understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. 
But atter he bas made the painting, he both bas it in his 
understanding, and be understands that it exists, because 
he has made it. 1 
lDee., ,ft. cit., p. 7. !he Latin text reads: "Ergo, 
domine, qui das eiutellectwa, da mihi, ut quantum soi. expi-
dire 1ntellig~ quia es sieut oredimus, et hoc as quod oredl.us. 
it quidem eredimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogi»ari 
posslt. An ergo non est aliqua talls natura, quia 'dixit in.ip-
iens in oorde suo: non est deus'? Sed oerte lpse idem insiplens, 
CWI audit hoc ipsum quod dico: 'aliquid quo maius nihil cogltari 
potest', intalligit quod audit; et quod intelligit in intelleotu 
8ius est, etlas 8i non intelllgat illud esse. Ali~ enia est 
r8lD e8se in intellectu, aliud inteillsere rem esse. Bam CUll plc-
tor praecogitat quae tacturus est, habet quid em in intel1ectu, 
.ed nondum intelligit esse quod Bondwa tecit. Cum vero lam pinx-
It, et habet in tntellectu at intelllg!t esse quod lam fecit." 
Vol. I, p. 101, 11. 3-13. 
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aence, even the tool is convinced that something exists 
in the understanding, at least, than which nothing greater 
can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he under-
stands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the under-
standing. And assuredly that, than which nothing greater 
can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. 
For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it 
can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater. 
Therefore, it that, than which nothing greater can be 
conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, 
than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than 
which a greater can be conceived. But obY1ously this is 
impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a 
being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it 
exists both in the understanding and in reality. 
CTrlAPTER III 
And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be con-
ceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive ot a 
being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is 
greater than one which can be oonceived not to exist. Hence, 
it that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be 
conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing 
greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable 
contradiction. There is, then, so trul~ a being than which 
nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot 
even be conoelved not to exist; and this being thou art, 0 
Lord, Our God. 2 
2Ibid., pp. 8-9. !'he Latin text reads: "Convincitur er-
go etiam Inslpiens eSS8 vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil maiul 
cogitari potest, quia hoc cum audit intellig1t, et qu1dqui4 1n-
telligitur in intellectu est. it carte 1d quo maius cogitar1 ne-
quit, non poteat coglta.r1 e8se in solo 1ntelleotu. 8i .nim vel 
in solo 1ntellectu est, poteat cogitar1 8sse et 1n ret quod ma-
iue est. 8i ergo 14 quo malus cogltarl non poteat, est in solo 
intellecVuI id ipSUB quo maius oogitari non potest, est quo ma-
ius oogitari potest. Sed certe hoc esse Don potest. Exist1t er-
go procul dubio allquld quo maius cogltarl non valet, at in in-
tellectu et in re. Quod utique sic vere eat, ut nee cogltarl poasit non es-
se. Bam poteat cogitarl ess. aliquid, quod non possit cogitari 
non esae; quod maius est quam quod non es.e aogitari potest. Quare ai id quo maiu8 nequit cogitari, poteat aogitari non esse. 
1d ipsuz quo maius cogitari nequit, non est id quo maius cogitarj 
nequit; quod convenire non potest. Sic ergo vere est aliquid 
quo maius oogitari non potest, ut nec cog1tar1 possit non e.se. 
Et hoc 88 tu, domine deus noster." ibid., 1. 13- p. 103. 
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So truly, therefore, dost thou exist, 0 Lord, my God, 
that thou canst not be conceived not to exist; and rightly. 
For, it a mind could conceive ot a being better than thee, 
the creature would rise above the Creator; Elnd this is most 
absurd. And, indeed, whatever else there 1s, except thee 
alone, can be conceived not to exist. To thee alone, there-
tore, 1t belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, 
and hence in a h1gher degree than all others. For, what-
ever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a 
less degree 1t belongs to 1t to exist. Why, then, has the 
tool said in b.is heart, "there is no God" (Psalms xiv. I), 
since it is so eVident. to a rational mind, that thou dost 
exist in the highest degree of all? Wh7, exeept that he is 
dull and a tool. , 
This is the general structure ot the argument. Further embel-
lishment, commented upon by Anselm in his reply to Gaun11o, ap-
pears in chapter tour. 
But how has the tool said in his heart what he could not 
oonceive; or how i8 it that he could not conceive what he 
said in his heart? Since it i8 the same to say in the 
heart, and to conceive. 
But, ir really, nay, since rea117, he both conceived, 
because he said in his heart; and did not say in his heart 
because he could not conceive; there is more than one waT 
in which a thing is said in the heart or conceived. For, 
in one sense. an object is conceived, when the word signi-
tying it is conceived; and in another, when the very entity, 
which the object is, is understood. 4 
'Ib&d., p. 9. The Latin text read8: "Sic ergo vere es, 
domine deus meus, ut nee oogitari possis non esse. Et merito. 
8i enie a1iqua mens pas set cogitare aliquid .elius te, asoenderet 
creatura super creatore., et iudicaret de creatore; quod valda 
est absurdum. Et quidem quldquid est allud praeter te solum, 
poteat cogitari non e.se. Sol us igitur verissia. omnium, at 1dee 
maxime omnium babes ease; quia quldquid aliud eat non sic vere, 
et idciroo minus habet esse. Our itaque 'd1x1t insip1ens in cor-
de suo: non est deus', cum tam in promptu sit rationali menti 
te maxima omnium esse? Our, nisi quia atultuB at inaipiene. If 
~., 11. }-11. 
4i3M.' pp. 9-10. !'he Latin text reads: "Verum quomodo dixit in • quod oogitare non potuit; aut quomodo cog1tare non 
potuit quod dixit in corde. cum idea sit dicere in corde at 00g1-
tare? "IUod 81 vere, immo quia vere at cogitaY1t quia dixit in 
corde, et non dixit in corde quia oos1tare non potu1t· non uno f~f~ modo 41c1tur .11quid in corae vel cog1tatur." ib1d., 11. 
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In the termer sense, then , God can be aoncei ved not to 
exist; but the latter, not at all. For no one who under-
stands what fire and water are can conceive tire to be water, 
in accordance with the nature e,f the facts themselves. al-
though tbis 1s possible according to the words. So. then, 
no one \'1'::10 understands \"h~t God is can conceive that God does 
not exist; although he says th~se words in his heart, either 
without any or with some fcreign signification. For, God is 
that than which a greater cannot be conceived. And be who 
thoroughly understands this, assuredly understands that this 
being so truly exists, that not evan in concept can it be 
non-existent. Therefore. he who understands that God so 
exists, CBDnot conceive that be does not exist. 
I thank thee, gracious Lord, I thank thee; because what 
I formerly believed by thy bounty, I nov so understand b7 
thine illumination, that it I were unwilling to believe that 
thou d08t exist. I should not be able not to understand this 
to be true. 5 
!be Proslogiog was read by people within and without the 
Abbey of Bee. One of the outs1derB, Gat.ml1o t a monk of Mamou-
tier DOnI' Tours, lfrote a sbort reply to the Proslogion. in which 
be lauded A.raelm tor the ardor and aplr1 tual ~Ieal th of' his treat-
ment of the divine essenoe and chided him for using weak argumen-
tation to prove or oonolude to God's existenoe. As far as Ga.un-
ilo was concerned, the 801e method ot proving God's existence was 
inference trom empirically given data in the world. The other 
Aliter enim cogitatur res cum vox eam significano cogltatur, ali-
ter cum 14 ips~ quod res est 1ntelligitur. 1110 Itaque modo po-
test cogitari deus non esse, iato vero minime. Uullu5 qulppe in-
telligens i4 quod deus est, poteat oogitarEt quia deus non est. 1t 
~.t 11. 18-21. 
'Ibid., p. 10. !he Latin text reads: "licet haec verba 
dioat in corde. aut sine ulls aut cum a11qua extranea significa-
tione. Deus enim est id quo maiua oogitar1 non poteat. Quod qui 
bene 1ntellig1t, utique 1ntelligit 1d ipsua 81c esse, ut ne cogi-
tations queat non esse. Qui ergo inte.L11g1t sic esse deum, ne-
quit eum non esse cogitare." 
Gratias tibi, bone dOminai gratias tib1, quia quod prius 
oredidi te dODAnte, 1am sic intel 1ao te 111uainantei ut 8i te ~o 
lim credere, non poss1m non tntelllsera." Ibid., p. 04, 11. 1-1. 
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tvo notions that formed the basis of his rebuttal were his unwil-
lingness to equate the object ot the .formula "a being than l1hlch 
nothing greater caD be thought" with God and his knowledge that 
some people aotually deny God's existence. 
He credits Anselm with making two po:i.nts: the first beins 
that the divine natUl"0 1n in the intellect when the f'o:::-mula tfa 
beint~ trvm which nothing i5reater can be thought" is mentioned and 
understood; thtJ Heeond, that. the divine being also Axists in real· 
ity or else it would not be ua being than which nothing greater 
can be thought." The second point follows from the first but 
the .first 1s incorrect; so both are talse. 
The divine nature cannot be in the intellect wh~n the 
tormula io h~ard and understood. It n man attempts to prove the 
existence ot something in reality from a concept, this concept 
must have a different status in bis mind trom a falae or doubt-
tul concept or one ot something which is known not to exist. 
But, in order to enJoy this superior status, the object of the 
conoept must first be proved to exist in reality. "I cannot con-
ceive, It Gaunilo writes, "of it in any othezo wq than by under-
standing it, that 1s, by comprehending 1n '11fT kno1<Jledge its exis-
tence in re·alit,.. ,.6 And if' this is the case. the order 1s 
ohanged trom concept to rea11tj to ooncept from rea11t~. Sinee 
the tormula as a conoept has the same value as the concepts ot 
unrea.l objects, it ca.n be thought not to exist just as God can be 
6Deane , la J!lthaLf .2! !h! 11'001;., ah. 2, p. 146. 
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thought not to exist. God. indeed, can be thought not to exist, 
tor it His non-existence were impossible to conceive "what was 
the object at this argument against one who doubts or denies the 
existence at such a being_"? 
The analogy ot the painter who paints a picture does not 
apply. :rellowing Augustine, Gaunilo holds that the thought or 
imagined picture which springs up in the painter's mind is a liv-
ing part ot him. file picture generated in bis art 1s nothing 
other than a part ot his intellect which. in turn, is a part at 
the painter. All other truths which do not pertain to the nature 
01 the intellect are perceived b,. thought or hearing. '.ftle tormu-
la would be numbered among those truths not pertaining to the na-
ture at the intellect. Even granting that "a being a greater 
than which can not be thought" is heard and understood, it would 
still not have the same status as an interior Picture.8 
Moreover, upon hearing the formula, it is as impossible 
to have actual knowledge ot the object ot the formula according 
to either genua or species as it is to have actual knowledge ot 
God. It someone were to tell Gaun110 about a man whom Gaunllo 
did not know, Gaunilo could imagine him as an actuall,. existing 
being, even though he were a purely mental fiction that never 
existed and never would exist. He could conceive ot him as liv-
ing, because he knows by both genus and species what a man 1s. 
?Ibid. 
8 Ibid., ch. ,. p. 147. 
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Since he can be deceived about things of which he has knowledge, 
the possibility of deception greatly increases in regard to 
things ot which he does not have such knowledge. God and "8 be-
ing than which nothing greater can be thought" are conceived "as 
by a man who does not know the object, and conceives ot it only 
in accordance with the movement of his mind produced by hearing 
the word."9 Neither the concept ot God nor or Ita being than 
which nothing greater can be thought" are already in the mind. 
!he second pOint, namely, that existence in the intellect 
ot fta being than which nothing greater can be thought" implies 
its real existence or else it would not be greater than every-
thing else, Gaunilo rejeots on the grounds that, since the idea 
has the same status as any doubtful or talse notion bas in the 
intellect, any actually existing being would be greater than it. 
In order to show that this being 1s greater than aD7thing else 
"it should be proved first that this being itself really exists 
somewhere. MIO Existence is proved on the basis ot an empiricall, 
given existent. otherwise, Gaunilo would have to admit that an 
island having no owner or inhabitants and possessiDg the greateat 
abundance ot riches exists merely beoause he understands what is 
meant when he hears a description ot the perfeot island, a pro-
cedure he deems absurd. ll 
9 p. 149 • Ibid., 
........... 
lOIbid., cb. ,. p • 1~. .......... 
llIbid., ch. 6, pp. 150-51 • 
.......... 
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The statement itsolf that a being which could be thought 
not to exist is a lesser being than that which cannot be thought 
not to exist Gaunilo maintains does not prove the actual exis-
tence of the object ot the formula. The proper prooedure would 
be to cogently prove the being's real existence and then compare 
it with other beings to ascertain it it really is greater than 
all others. 
Instead of atating that the non-existence of the greatest 
being cannot be thought, it would be better to state that the 
posaibility of its non-existence is impossible to understand. 
In this way the greatest being would be distinguished trom the 
many thoughts in the human mind which do not and are known not to 
conform to reality. Gaunilo does not know if' he could think of 
his own non-existence when he knows beyond doubt that he does 
exist. It makes no difference to his argumentation. In either 
case there 1s no reason tor thinking ot the necessary existence 
ot the object of' the formula or or God. For, if Gaunilo oan 
think of his own non-existence while being absolutely certain he 
exists, it tollows that he can think ot the non-existence ot any-
thing else, including God whom he knows and believes to exist. 
And. if he cannot, it follows that the impossibility of being 
thought not to exist is by no means a property ot GOd. l2 
Anselm begins his rebuttal with his strongest argument, 
the one from faith. Gaunilo has maintained that the formula is 
in the mind in the same way as a concept whose exemplification 
in reality is impossible or unthinkable and tha.t its mere pre-
sence in the intellect is no basis tor claiming that it i8 ex~m­
plitied in reality. From theae statements Anselm reasons that 
either God is not "a being than which nothing greater can be 
thought" or 81s. be is not understood and in the intellect. But, 
both o£ the statements are talse. By faith and conscience all 
Ohristians know that theI'. is a God and hence Re is in their un-
derstanding. By taith and conscience they also know that He is 
the Supreme Being and hence He is the being than which nothing 
greater can be thought. l3 
Atter arguing from faith, Anselm procedes to argue from 
reason. If Tla being a grea.ter than which cannot be thought" can 
even be thought to exist it must eXist, "for that than which a 
greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived except as without 
beginning. n14 In order to £ultill the requirements of the torm-
ula, the being must be eternal and eternity implies necessary 
existence. Moreover, it must exist as a whole everywhere and 
always; tor, i£ it did not, its non-existence at some time or 
some place could be thought, which is contrar.r to the tormula. 
Furthermore, suppose that the greatest being does not exist, even 
though it can be conceived to exist, or that it cannot be con-
ceived to exist eVen though it exists. In both cases a contra-
13Deane , Ansel,m's Apologetic, ch. I, pp. 153-54. 
14+bid •• p. 154. 
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diction arises. Neither alternative satis~ies the requirements 
tor "8 being a greater than whior. oa~ot be thcught. n15 Anselm 
has just made statements about the greatest being, statements 
which both he and Gaunilo understand not by faith alone but by 
reason. Sinoe they both understand what they are saying, "as-
suredly a being than whioh a greater cannot be oonceived exists, 
and is in the understanding, at least to this extent--that these 
statements regarding it are understood. nl6 To say that somethinS 
is not in the intellect because it is not thoroughly understood 
is as absurd as to say a man oannot see daylight because he can-
not tace the pure, direot rays of the sun. And it the tool doe8 
not understand the formula when he hears it spoken in his own 
language, he is either very stupid or else he has no mind at all. 
What 1s understood 1s in the intellect just as what is thought 
is in thought. l ? 
Gaunilo's example of inferring the actual existence of 
this island trom the faot that when it is described the descrip-
tion is understood is not to the point. Anselm's argumentation 
deals only with a being a greater than which cannot be thought. 
Even the perfect island described has parts, but the being than 
which a greater cannot be thought is simple. Gaunilo suggests 
that he can eas11y think of the non-existence of the perfect 18-
15Ib1d., p. 155. 
16Ibid.t p. 156 • 
.. 
l?Ibid. 
land. With this Anselm agrees. He does not agree, however, that 
the non-existence of the perfeot b.in~ ca~ be thought; because 
as soon as someone thinks the pertect being does not exIst, he 
is thinking of something other than the par/oet be:ng.18 
Whereas Gaunilo suggests it is better to state that the 
possibility ot the perfect being's non-existence is impossible 
to understand rather than to be thought or conceived, Anselm 
maintains that the proper expression is impOSSibilIty to be 
thought. It is impossible to understand that a being which is 
ltnown beyond the shadow ot a doubt to exist does not exist. In 
this sense God is not the only being whose non-existence cannot 
be understood. The impo8.1bil~ty at non-existence being thought •. 
however, 1s applied only to God. Men imagine many non-existent 
things as existing and many existing things as non-existent. A 
distinction is to be made between thinking and understanding, be-
cause no existent can be understood as non-eXistent, while all 
creatures. which have a beginning or an end or are composite, cam 
be thought not to exist. "That being alone, on the other hand, 
cannot be conceived not to exist, in which any conception dis-
covera neither beginning nor end nor oomposition of parts, and 
which any conception linds a.lways and everywhere as a whole. nl9 
Anselm agrees that some people deny God's existenoe. Ho~ 
is this denial possible when God cannot even be conceived not to 
18Ibid., ch. 3. pp. 158-59. 
19Ib1d •• eh. 4, p. 160. 
exist? ~o this quer,J Anselm answers that there is a d1fterence 
between understanding a thing and thinking about the word which 
signifies the thing. "In one sense, an object is conceived, when 
the word signifying it is conceived; and in another, when the 
very entity, which the object is, 1s understood. In the tormer 
sense, then, God can be conceiVed not to exist; but in the lattaJ 
not at al1."20 A person may say that tire 1& water so long as 
he precinds tromthe actual meaning ot the words Utire" and 
"water t• when he joins them 1nto thought. But it he knows what 
tire and water really are, he cannot truthfully join the words 
into a meaningtul sentence. Tbe same applies to God. No one whe 
really understands what God is can truly and meaningtully think 
he does not exist. It a person thoroughly understands what is 
meant by the formula fta being than which a greater cannot be 
thought, tt he "assuredly understands that this being so truly 
exists, that not even in ooncept can it be non-existent. n2l B7 
thorough understanding Anselm does not mean an adequate or proper 
ooncept ot God. Like kunilo, he realize. that such an under-
standing is be70nd the power ot man. In the introduction to the 
Pro.logion he writes: "1 do not endeavor, 0 Lord, to penetrate 
tb1' 8ubl1mi ty t for in no wise do I compare my understanding with 
that; but I long to understand in 80me degr •• thy truth, which 
my heart believes and 10ve •• "22 Ind.ed, God is more than a be1Dt 
2ODeane, Proslog10n, ch. 4, pp. 9-10. 
21Ibid., p. 10. 
22Ibid •• eh. 1, pp. 6-7. 
than which nothing greater can be thought. He is a being greater 
th~l that which can be thought. 
According to Anselm, part ot Gaunilots difficulty arose 
trom a misconception. Gauni10 wrote that tfwhat is greater than 
all other beings is in the understanding; and if it is in the 
understanding, it exists also in reality, for otherwise the beinS 
whioh is greater than all would not be greater than &11.,,23 An-
selm, however, argued from the presence of a "being greater than 
which cannot be gonceived. tt24 The two statements are not the 
same. It is easy to prove that & being than which a greater can-
not be conceived exists in reality, that its non-existence is im-
possible, and that the possibility of its non-existence is incon-
ceivable. Anything which does not exist is certainly able not to 
exist. But whatever can be thought not to exist, whether it ac-
tually exists or nott d08s not fulfill the hypothesis ot a be ins 
than which a greater cannot be conceived. A man can conceive ot 
an absolutely pertect being that 80 necessarily exists that it 
~annot even be thought not to exIst.25 
On the other hand, the argument trom a being greater than 
~ll others does not readily exclude possible non-existence or mul· 
tiplicity of greatest beings nor inc'lude identification with the 
being than which nothing greater can be thought. In order to 
23Agselm's ARolosetic, ch. 5, p. 161. 
24Ibid., p. 163. 
25Ibid., pp. 162-163. 
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prove God·s existence, Gaunilo's version "requires another prem-
ise than the predication, greater !h!a !!! othG~ beiD5s,,,26 
whereas in Anselm's version "there 18 no need ot any other than 
this very predication, ~ beina than wh!oh ~ sreater cannot ~ 
conoeived.,,27 
Gaunilo sued that the formula is understood in the same 
manner that unreal objects are understood and are in the under-
standing. This is all that Anselm was trying to establish. Gau-
nl10 strengthened his argument with the example or a painter 
painting a picture. Before he paints the pioture, the painter 
bas the image ot the painting in his mind. Before the picture is 
aotually painted, it is an unreal object. Anselm shows that this 
example is not to the point. Anselm was trying to demonstrate 
that "what is not understood to exist oan be 1n the un4erstand-
ing,,,28 not that the notion ot a being than which nothing greater 
can be thought is the same as the conoeptual image acoording to 
whioh a painter paints. If unreal beings oan be in the under-
standing when heard and understood, certainly the formula 1s s1mi· 
larly understood when heard. The next step 1s to discover whe-
ther the objeot ot the formula 1s solely in the understanding as 
are unreal objects or whether it also exists in reallty.29 
26 Ibid. t p. 163. 
27Ibid• 
28Ib1d., ch. 8, p. 167. 
29Ib1d., ob. 6, pp. 164-65. 
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Gaunilo, moreover, claimed that he coul~:l understand the 
formula when he heard it. He also claimed that he could deny 
Godts existence, because he did not understand God. But the for-
mula expresses an object and that object is God. Therefore. An-
selm cannot lathom how Gaunilo would be able to deny the exis-
tence of what be understands on the grounds that he does not un-
derstand it. 1'0 Anselm, this is a ridiculous contradiction. "It 
is incredible. I say, that any man denies the existence of this 
being because he denies the existence ot God, the sensory percep-
tion of whom he in no wise conceives of.~}O 
According to Anselm, it is obviously not true that Gaun-
ilo 1s unable to understand the formula in terms ot any real ob-
ject, genus, or species. The notion of a belngthan which no-
thing greater can. be thought arises trom an analysis of the world 
which 1s known in terms or genus, speCies, and actual individuals 
Goods are compared, tor instance, in acoordance with the manner 
in which they approach one another in goodnees. That which is 
less good is like that which is better, beoause it too is good, 
although not in the same degree. "It is therefore evident to anT 
rational mind, that by ascending trom the lesser good to the 
greater, we oan torm a considerable notion ot a being than which 
a greater is inconceivable.,,;l A. lesser good can begin to be and 
cease to be, but it would be greater it it did not cease to be, 
30Ibld., ch. ? p. 166. 
;lIbid. 
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and still greater if it Dever began to be nor will eYer cease to 
be. A good, then, a greater than which cannot be th~ught will 
have to be a necessarily existent, etemPil b.ln~. The notioD is 
formed trom the notion ot actuall~ existing objeet~ than which a 
greater can be thought. In this way, the fool who "denies that 
a notion may be tormed trom other objecta of a being than which 
a greater is inconceivable .. 32 oan be easi17 refuted; and the 
Catholic should need no further proof than st. Paul's famous pas-
sage wherein he maintains the invisible things ot God can be seen 
in his vestiges in creation." 
Even if Gaunilo' s contention were true that thea.ing 
than which Dothing greater can be thought could not be oonceived 
or understood, it would still be true that this be1ngwould be 
'both conceivable and. intelligible. flIpgoI.lceivable is conce.lvable 
although that to which the word lpconoeivable can be applied i$ 
not conceivable. n34 The formula would be both conceivable and 
intelligible even though the being itselt to whioh it reters 
were neither conceived nor understood. An7 one who denies that 
a being a greater than which cannot be thought exists muat con-
ceive and Ullderstand his negative judpent. ftBut this denial ha 
cannot understand O.L' conceive ot without ita component terms; and 
a term of this statement is ~ belns than which ~ greater cannot 
~2I214., p. 168. 
3~Roman~ I. 19-21. 
------_.-----.--._.----------_.-------
344q$.l~~8 AR~logtitlq~ ah. 9, p. 168. 
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~ conceived."" This being Is concelved and understood and what 
is conceived and understood is in the conoept and l~~derstanding. 
Moreover, this being oannot be conceived ot and nnd~rstood as 
possibly not existing; tor than it would not be conceived ot and 
understood tor what it Is, a being than wbich a granter cannot be 
thought. nWhen a being than which a greater is inconceivable i8 
conoeived, it it is a being whose non-existenoe is possible that 
i8 oonoeived; it is not a being thdn which a greater cannot be 
coneeived."3£, According to the law ot non-contradiction, a paX'-
son oannot think of two opposite thoughts at the same time. It 
tallows, then. that It what he conoeives of must exist; for anythil1t 
whoae non-existenoe is possible, 1s not that of which be COD-
Ioleive •• rt '7 
with this refutation Anselm believed that he had shown 
what he had previously proved in the opening of the Proslos;ion 
thad reall,. been proved, D.WDely, that the being of the formula "is 
~f neoessity. trom the very tact that it is understood and con-
~eived. proved also to exist in reality, and to be whatever we 
_hould believe of the divine Bubstance."38 
"Jbld. t p. 169. 
,6Ibid• 
" , 
37Jbi:!. 
38 Ibid., ch. 10, ~. 170. 
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OHAPTER III 
MALCOLM'S AND HARTSHORNE'S UNDERSTANDING 
OF AU:3ELM· S ARGUMENT 
Malcolm indicates that lIin Anselm's Proslog1on and Respon 
sio editoris there are two different pieces or reasoning which 
-
he did not distinguish from one another."1 but which should be 
distinguished in order to shed light upon the problem of the on-
tological argument. The first argument. an argument from contin-
gent existence, is in chapter two; the second, an argument trom 
necessary existence, is in chapter three. In the first argument, 
Anselm states that a being is greater if it exists in both the 
intellect and in reality than if it exists merely in the intel-
lect. From the wording ot the text in both Latin and English ver-
sions it is hard to decide whether Anselm also meant that exis-
tence in reality is by itself greater than existence in the mind 
alone or that intentional existence is interior to real existence 
At any rate. the implication in the argument is tha.t "if I con-
ceive of something which does not exist then it is possible for 
it to exist, and II l!lli. .2!. greater.!! II exists ~ !.! II does 
not exist.,,2 Anselm. in other words, treats existence as a per-
1Noman Malcolm. "Anselm's OntoloSlca.l 
Philosophical Review, LXIX (January. 1960). p. 
2 Ibid., p. 43. 
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tection, as a real predicate. 
Immanuel Kant claimed to have demolish~d this notion ot 
existence being a real predicate in ~ Critique £i ~ Reason. 
According to Kant, no !natter how many predicates are attached to 
a subject, even it it be completely determined, nothing is added 
to it by attributing existence to it. It that were the case, the 
exact objects ot concepts would not exist. Malcolm agrees with 
Kant, maintaining that Anselm'sf1rst argument is invalid on ac-
count of its basis in nth! talse doctrine that existence is a per. 
tection.",3 Existence is rather that by which perfection is pos-
sible. 
The argument in chapter three is different in that it 
rests upon the notion that necessary existence is a property ra-
ther than that mere existence is a property. Whereas the first 
argument stresses contingent existenoe over nonexistence, the 
second aQpbasizes neoessary existence over non-necessary or con-
tingent existence. Malcolm points out that Anselm says two 
things in the second argument: " 
first, that a being whose non-existence is logically impos-
sible 1s -greater" than a being whose nonexistence is logi-
cally possible (and theretore that a being a greater than 
which cannot be conceived must be one whose nonexistence 
is logically impossible); second. that ~ is a being than 
which a greater cannot be conceived. 4 
There is a common meaning for the illOrd "God tI according to 
which the statement: "God is a being a greater than which cannot 
3 Ibid., p. 44. 
4 Ibid., p. 45. 
45 
be conceived" is a logically necessary truth. Anselm's use ot 
the word "greater'· in this formula is puzzling enough to require 
some explanation. Malcolm amplifies the meaning by explaining 
what is com~only meant by the notion ot superior and inferior, 
dependent and independent, limited and unlimited, all of which 
are interconnected. 5 With this expla.nation be supports his no-
tion of God. 
In ordinary language the words "superior" and "inferior" 
ma.y reter to quantities. For instance, Joey Brown's knowledge 
ot algebra 1s designated as superior to Billy Black' S t i.! Joey 
knows more algebra than Billy. God is also said to be superior 
because He bas more knowledge, to mention only one perfection, 
than any other being. 
Moreover, the \ford "dependent" is used to signify a cau-
sal relationship. A house, for instance, depends upon an archi-
tect and builders for its constitution and upon a whole series ot 
causes such aa painting and repair work and upon conditions such 
as no serious storm or tire for its preservation. The house do •• 
not exist by itself either initially or consequently. It is de-
pendent. God, on the other band, as one reads in common prayers 
and the Nicene Creed does not depend upon others tor his exis-
tence or continued existence. He 1s the Supreme Maker not the 
made nor the made-maker. Independence is one ot the notable 
characteristics ,\ih1ch distinguish Him trom other beings. "To 
conceive of anything as dependent upon something else for its 
existence 1s to conceive of it as a lesser being than God.,,6 
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The notions of dependence and interiority and of independence and 
superiority are linked. If something depends upon something else 
it is said to be inferior to another something which, in all 
other respects is the same, does not. 
Closely allied to the notion of dependence is that of 
limitedness. An engine that would not require .fuel would be said 
to be superior to one that is limited by or dependent upon a fuel 
supply for effective service. The only belng that is not common-
ly conceived of as limited is God. He is conceived ot as an ab-
solutely unlimited being. No limits are placed upon either his 
existenoe or his operation. Nothing makes Him dependent. No-
thing, not even Himself. prevents or could prevent Him trom exis-
ting or operating without bound. 
This unlimitedness also excludes any chance or contingent 
existence in God. If it were possible that God could not-exist 
and should bappen to eXist, He would not be the eternal being 
that He is commonly conceived to be; because, if He could not-
exist and does exist, it would be possible that He could go out 
ot existence just as Be came into existence. This implies dura-
tion, a notion which is so alien to that of eternity. Duration 
implies a beginning, a continuing, and an ending; hence, a cause 
tor each. None of these comport ·with the notion of eternity. 
6 Ibid., p. 47. 
47 
In short, contingency in regard to either existence or nonexis-
tence has no application to God. God's existence is necessary 
exis"t;ence. The only alternative is that His existence is logi-
cally impossible. But an affirmation of the logical impossibil-
ity of God's existence is tantamount to maintaining there is Q 
contradiction in Anselm's formula tor God.7 Malcolm asaumes that 
the formula is not self-contradictory. He cannot give a dem.on-
strable proof of its self-consistency nor does be believe that 
one can be legitimately demanded.8 
Necessity in God extends to all of His properties. He 1s 
a necessary being; everything in Him is necessary. His necessity 
however, is not something one proves through empirical data or 
test criteria. That He necessarily exists, that He is necessar-
ily omnisCient, all-good, and omnipotent are requirements of our 
a priori conception of Him. "The a priori proposition 'God neces-
sarily exists' entails the proposition 'God exists,' if and only 
if the latter also is understood as an a priori proposition: in 
whioh ease the two propositions are equivalent. 1t9 For Malcolm., 
therein lies the validity of Anselm t s proo,f' for the existence ot 
God. 
Many philosophers, attesting that existence 1s not a prop-
ert7 ot God, claim to have destroyed this ontological argument. 
7 Ibid., p. 50. 
S Ibid., p. 60. 
-
9Ibid • t p. 50. 
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Certainly, contingently existing things do not have existence as 
Ll property, but this is not true ot a necessary being. The onto-
logical interence is not a jump trom the abstract intentional or-
der to the concrete realm of contingent existents. "What Anselm 
did was to give a demonstration that the proposition 'God neces-
sar!ly exists' is entailed by the proposition 'God is a being a 
greater than which cannot be conceived' (which is equivalent to 
'God is an absolutely unlimited being·)."lO The absolutely un-
limited being is the neoessary being. 
According to modern logic all existential statements are 
contingent and the nocessity in propositions is based upon the 
manner 1n which words are used. One modern ori tic, J. N. Findlq 
argues that the religious needs or people require that God be the 
supreme excellence manifested by such properties as omniSCience. 
complete independence, superiority in rank as well as in degree, 
and necesssr.y existence. The contingency dogma of existential 
propositions, on the other hand, shows that the religiously ade-
quate ooncept ot God cannot be satisfied. As n result, God's 
existence is impossible. The Anselmisn ar~~ent proves the exact 
opposite ot what Anselm intended to prove.11 
Malcolm maintains that Findlay- and other!:! misuse aspects 
o! their thought. The logical law that necessity in proposition. 
is based upon the manner in which words are used "oannot possibly 
lOIbid. 
liN. findlay, MOan God·s Existence Be Disproved?," Mind, 
LVII (April, 1948), pp. 176-18,. 
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have the implication that every existential proposition must be 
cont1ngent."l2 Both the Ohristians and the Jews speak in a mean-
ingful way ot the necessary existence ot God. And their state-
ments are not to be understood as h7pothet1ca1. A statement like 
"God is eternal" 1s not to be understood to Signify "it God ex-
ists then he is eternal," which would be the same as saying nit 
is possible that God may not exist, therefore he a&7 not be eter-
nal." Eternity by definition excludes any contingency wbat.oever 
Kant, Oaterus, and others oontradict themselves when they link 
the a priori truth ot the proposition ot God's necessary exis-
tence with the possibility ot las nonexistence. l3 !he two con-
cepts in no "&7 mesh. 
Malcola • s proot t then. i8 based upon the commonly accep-
ted oonoept1on of God and the rejection of the law ot 10gio con-
cerning the contingency ot all existential propositions. In sum-
mary torm his proof ia: 
It God t a being a greater than which oannot be con-
oeived, does not exist then He oannot co •• into existenoe. 
POl' it He would .ith.r have b.en ~!USea 10 come into exis-
tenoe or haye happ.ned to oome in 0 exlstenoe, in either 
oa.e He would be a l1aited beins, which by our oonception 
ot Him He is not. Sinoe Be cannot come into existenoe, it 
Be doe. not exist His existenoe is impossible. It H. do •• 
exist He cannot bave come into existenc •••• nor oan He cease 
to exist, for nothing could oause Him to cease to exist nor 
could it just happen that He ceased to exist. So if God 
exists His existenoe 1s necessary. Thus God's existence 
ia either impossible or necessary. It can be the torser 
only it the concept of such a being is aelt-contradictor" 
12Ibid., p. 55. 
13Ibid., p. 57. 
or in some way logically absurd. Assuming that this i8 
not so, it tollows that He necessarily exists. 14 
Hartshorne agrees with Malcolm that there are two argu-
ments in Anselm's work, one from contingent existenoe and one 
trom necessary existence, and he also rejects the law ot logic 
ooncerning the contingency of all existential statements. He 
contends that: 
the theory ot the modality ot existential judgments (their 
unitorm contingency) upon which rejection at the argument 
chiefly rests bas little to commend it, being supported 
solely by an exceedingly loose torm ot analogy, ass1ml1at-
ins to ordInary contingent judpents (those which nearly 
all philosophers agree are such) two torms which are radi-
cally distInct tram them and trom each other, and whose 
contingency is by no means non-controversial. 15 
"Anselm's intuition was that God exists 1n a superior manner, the 
ordinary way ot existing being a detect. n16 !he critics have 
overlooked this insight, Hartshorne claims, !hey content them-
selves. otten superficially, with retuting the proposition that 
contingent existence adds nothing to a concept. '''l'hat Anselm ar-
gue. also trom this more dub10us premise does not justi.ty the 
critics. dl? The ways ot the critics Hartshorne tinds strange. 
"Here is a man everyone thinks worthy ot retuting. but almost no 
one thinks worth studying.dlS Hartshorne has studied Anselm and 
l4~., pp. 49-50. 
150harles Hartshorne, The ~!iC ot Pertection and other 
Es8a~s in NeOClassical Hetap~iI08 sarle, Ill.: open court, 
pp. ()W~. 
16n&d •• p. 58. 
l7Ibid. 
18Ibid •• p. ,2. 
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the controversy over his argument as well. The list he gives or 
twenty Objections19 to the argument 1s the longest, to the best 
ot his knowledge, that has appeared in print. ot thesetwent~t 
which he refutes in his book lh! LoS1c g! Perfection, he has 8ing~ 
led out three tor special consideration: Kant's argument that ex-
istence 1s not a perfection or, to put it another way,non-exls-
tence 1s not a detect; the positiTist . rgument th,fit there 1s on17 
emotive meaning, not cognitional, in the assertion that God ex-
ists; and the crucial lcglcal-tn>e objection that, since exis-
tence is concrete, it cannot be on the same logical level as an 
abstract predicate, and therefore cannot be conta1ned in it. 
Since these three objections are the major ones and since their 
refutation invol vea Hartshorne's theory on the argw:r.ent, they 
will suffice as a framework tor statlng his position. 
His position on the Anselmian argument is midway between 
that ot Malcola and Findlay. One reaSOQ tor this is his approach 
He approaohes the subject from a rationalistic pos1t10n20 within 
neoolassical metaph7sica.2l Instead ot employing eaotionally 
persuasive arguments, he strives to argue from the basis ot cool, 
detached reason. Instead ot holding tho being, absoluteness, ne-
c •• sity, and substance of classical metaphysics as primary phil-
osophical conceptions, be opts tor creative becoming, event, P08-
19Ibid• , pp. 45-47. 
20Ibid• , p. 4. 
2l1bid• , p. ix. 
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sibility, and relativity. Hence, he conceives ot God a8 a chang-
ing God and clings to an a priori proof ot His exietence. 22 
Findlay argued that Anselm had proved that the idea ot 
God could prove His existence only it God is a necessary existent 
But modern logic shows that it-is impossible to have a necessary 
existent. Therefore, instead ot proving the exist@nce ot God. 
Anselm laid the basis tor the proof of His non-existence. Thus 
.rindlay forced the issue of choosing "between the view that the-
iam is logically invalid or impossible and the rejection ot the 
doctrine of 'modern logic' that Decessary existenoe is an absur-
4ity."23 Malcolm believes that existence is not a pertection and 
that necessary existence 1s not logically impossible, thereby aon~ 
tending the ontological argument in the second torm definitely 
proves God's existence rather than His non-existence. Olaiming 
the prool ia atheistic as ",ell as tbeistic, Har<tshorne is in 
qualitied agreement with both Maloolm and Findlay.24 Such a po~ 
'Oion is only •• Qmingly illogioal, becauae it depends upon two 
dilterent interpretations of pertection and its existence. It 
the argument is understood in terms ot the classioa1 definition 
ot divine pertection. then Hartshorne would agree that Findlay's 
insight 1s sound; if the argument is understood in terms ot the 
neoclassical definition of divine pertection. then 11alcolm's a.r-
22D~d. , p. 35. 
2';rt?&d. , p. 25. 
24I'tt!d •• p. 26. 
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gumentation is valid. It is only aocording to the neoclassical 
definition. Hartshorne maintains. that God's existe~ce can be 
proved by ontological interence. 
The definitions ot perfection, then, pl~y important roles 
in the argumentation. Anselm gave all the elements of the clas-
sical definition. In the Mouolosion, he showed that God is every~ 
thing it is good to be by essenoe. God is the Unlimited, the In-
tin! te, the All-knowing. All-powerful. Unohanging Completeness 
ot being. In Him there can be no chunge and tnerei'ore no poten-
cy_ In I1im tbere is no beginning, nor end. nor process of devel-
opment. Be is pure aot. 
Such a definition. by excluding aJl1' admixture of potenti-
ality with God's actuality and any progressive development in 
pertection. Hartshorne says, involves logioal diffioulties. 
These impasses become apparent in reference to God's operations, 
knowledge, and love. According to the classical view God could 
have Blade other worlds, yet He is still conoeived of as being 
without any unaotualized potentialities. God is all-knowing. yet 
His knowledge would have undergone no change if He had created 
any one ot a multitude of possible worlds instead of the one Be 
has created. But surely, liartshorne argues, "it it be denied 
~hat there are unactualized potentialities in God, it is oontra-
dictory to say that Be could have produced other worlds, and that 
Bo is sure in any case to know the truth. n25 According to the 
• I 1 • 
25 Ib~d.t p. 37. 
classical view God loves His creatures, yet ae would still reaain 
in the same state no matter what world He created. "B7 defini-
tion. to 'love' is to care about dit.ferenees, and to respond to 
them difterently.n26 !be intensity with whioh God loves would 
remain the same, but not His state or else His love would be gen-
eral, undifferentiated by the partioular objeots of Hia love. 
As each new person comes into the world God's love becomes great-
er, His knowledge more extensive, His operation more inclusive. 
Eaoh increment in the divine being also indicates unactualized 
possibIlities, because after having made a person in a particular 
W87 the divine possibility tor making the same person at the same 
time in a dirterent way remains torever unactualized. 
!he root of the difficulties inherent in the classical 
idea ot perteotion i8 the consideration ot God as pure aot. The 
inclu8ion of potentiality in the notion of God is not a detect. 
Hen in general agree that a man i8 better or more perfect than aD 
amoeba and that God 18 better than both a man and an .aoeba. An 
amoeba has little actuality and potentialit7 tor actions; an ard-
vark. which can walk and run as well as digest tood, has more ot 
both; a man, who can reason and choose trom innumerable possibil-
ities, has tar more; God, then who oan do all things, should be 
considered as having intinite potentiality.27 God's perfection 
a87 be called the "coinoidence ~ ~os81bilitl !! such. Q28 In 
26Ibid., p. 36. 
27Ibid. t p. '5. 
28Ibid., p. 38. 
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terms of God's knowledge, a possible is something that may be an 
object of God's intellection, and an actual, an actually exist1ns 
object ot the divino intellection. His actuality extends to eaoh 
and every actuality; His potent1ality, to each and every possi-
bility. His pertection 1s the modal coincidence of actuality and 
possibility. 
God is the God of religion, the object of worship.29 As 
such He must be worthy at the honor, love, and veneratton no com-
mands. Through the Bible lIe has told us that we should love Him 
with our whole heart, mind, and strength, and that we should love 
one another as we love ourselves. Observing this imperative is 
worshipping. Yet, how can we give all our love to God and still 
love ourselves and our neighbor? !he two commands would be con-
tradictory unless the actualities of creatures be included in God 
80 that nothing outside or Him 18 loved. The created values in 
creatures must evoke a corresponding interest in God or else theJ 
become "a bare nothing, or something external, and genuinely ad-
ditional, to Ood."'O Either a1ternat1ve is both irreligious and 
illogical. The God ot pure aot oannot be the God ot religion_ 
Although always remaining the supre.e being, tar above any orea-
ture no matter how exalted, the God worshipped by men must rise 
above Himself in suocessive states. NAll actuality must be in-
cluded in His aotuality, and all possibility in His potent1al QC-
29Ib1d., p. 40. 
'OIbid •• p. 41. 
tuality.1f3l 
Like the classical detinition of divine perteetion, the 
neoclassioal 1s a. priori and tolerant ot only necessary existence 
Unlike the classical definition, it includes some contingent 
properties, is unaffected by the inherent 10g1cal impasses. and 
reinforoes the argumentation tor the necessary existence of God 
trom His logioal possibility. 
Some people are biased against the Anselmian argument be-
oause they reel that religion is basioally an emotional affair, 
and therefore 8ubratlonal, others are biased against it because 
they believe religion is a matter of faith, and therefore supra-
rational. Neither group deems a oritioal inquiry into the theis-
tic proof necessary or rewarding. Perhaps the largest group ot 
philosophers who reject the a~~entt do so, because they think 
Kant has settled the problem forever. All they bave to do is re-
peat what Kant bas written or else give his solution a slightly 
difterent slant.32 
But did Kant, great thinker that he was, really solve the 
problem? He argued that a hundred real dollars are no better 
than a bundred imaginary dollars. Simple existenoe is not a per-
teotion nor its laok a detect. As tar as it goes his reasoning 
is sound. The only difficulty with it 1s that it does. not go far 
enough. "This whole line ot criticism has nothing to do with the 
31Ib1d• 
32Ib1d., pp. 48-49. 
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ca.e."33 Hartshorne emphasize. again and again that Kant's chief 
criticism, which has echoed and reechoed throughout the years, is 
just as empty as the echoes. Nor does Bume escape the censure. 
"Kant and Hume refuted, not the theistic arguments, but their own 
admittedly weak, versions ot some arguments tor a substitute tor 
theism. tt34 
Kant's mistake was to"ep 'he arguaent on the level of 
contingent existenoe, instead of raising it to the level ot nec-
ess&r,1 existence. Anselm was concerned with necessity, not con-
tingency. His inSight was that perfection necessarily exists. 
"!bere is, tben, so truly a being than which nothing greater can 
be conceived to exist, that it cannot even 'be conceived not to 
exist; and this being thou art, 0 Lord, our God. ,,35 Contingenc,. 
and necessity no more mix than oil and water. Contingency means 
that the subject of a property mayor m&7 not exist. In regard 
to existence, it is neutral. Neces8it7, on the other hand, is b,. 
no means neutral. Either the sub~ect necessaril,. exists or it 
necessarily does not exist. There is no middle ground. The argu~ 
•• nt has the irreviaable sodal structure of necessity. By neces-
slty, Hartshorne .eans analytic necessity, that is, necessity fol~ 
lowing upon an understanding of the terms of the proPoslt10n.,6 
33Ib1d;., p. 59. 
34 Ibid., p. 117. 
35Deane , .!E.. ill., !l:2!., 2, 1>P. 8-9. 
36uarta borne. .s;m,. !!:!?., p. 53 • 
Upon understanding the terms, it is contradictory to speak ot a 
pertect being, which exists contingently, just ~5 it 1s to speak 
ot a pertect being, which does not exist. Barring the exolusion 
ot contingency leaves but one alternative--necessary existence. 
D7 Becker's Postulate, the statement "it is'talse that it i& nec-
essarily untrue that pertection necessarily exists" striotly ta-
plies that pertection neoe •• arily exists.3? In tho oase of con-
tingent existenoe there oan be no interence ot either existent 
or non-existent subject; but in the case ot necessary existenc., 
there can be no inference otber than neoessarily existent subject 
unless the proposition Ma pertect being necessarily exists" is 
meaningless or inconsistent. !be property-instance distinction 
rules out both inconsistency and meaninglessness.,a 
Far more powerful than Kant's criticism is the 10g10a1-
t;n>G objection, acoord1n~ t() c,Jhich existencG, being more concrete 
than a predicate, 18 on a different logical level. Existence is 
not contained in a predicate, rather it is added to it. !he uni-
versal pertection Anaelm defines, theretore, cannot contain an 
individual which exemplities it. 39 Hence, no inter.nce can be 
made trom the predicate to the existence ot its subject. Hart-
shorne meets this difficulty on three oounts: the uniqueness ot 
the pertect being, the necessity ot 80me instanoe of the pertect, 
37Ibid., p. 51. 
38 Ibid. t p. 93. 
'9Ibi~. t p. 46. 
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and the contingency or the partioular exemplification ot the 8en-
eral instance of the perfect. 
To speak ot God i8 not to speak of a man or a fortiori ot 
anything else in the universe. A man is in process from birth to 
death, changing continually into different states yet remaining 
at the same time his individual self. This means that, though he 
i8 his individuality, only his states exemplify it. Moreover, he 
1s concretized through no proliferation ot specifying predicates. 
There has to be an experiential relation, some "this" or "that" 
indication. before a man caD be identified as this particular in-
dividual. Being a member or a class his individuality oannot be 
specified in the order of concepts. God. on the other hand, is 
not, as an individual, a member ot a class. He is unique; Ue is 
absolute perfection, a perfection exemplified in oonsecutive, con 
tingent states. The property-instance distinction, to be sure, 
applies to God, but He alooe is defined and designated solely in 
abstract terms. The predicates properly applying to Him oannot 
apply to any other individual. COincidence ot actuality with all 
actuality and ot possibility with all possibility is an attribute 
ot God 810oe.40 
\ 
The property-instance distinction requires further expla-
nation. Men and blue jays may exist. This particular man and 
thia particular blue jay may exist. This particular man may be 
seeing and hearing this particular blue jay singing. The senten-
40 Ibid., 66. 
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cas show at least three levels of existence: the occurrence ot 
certain actual states of individuals; the existence of certain 
individuals; and the existence ot certain kinds of individuals 
or of certain class properties. A natural necessity exists here; 
because, given the kinds, they have to exist in individuals who 
are in states; and at the same time there is contingency, because 
the kinds mayor may not exist, the exemplifying individual may 
be in this or that state. This conjunction or necessity and con-
tingency in the world of everyday experience provides the ground 
tor accepting necessity and contingency or property and instance 
in God.41 
By defining God as modal coincidence Hartshorne has a 
distinction "between an individual (a) in its abstract identity 
and (b) in its concrete actual states. u42 Like Jlan, God is in 
process; unlike Dlan, He must exist throughout a process, which 
bas no beginning nor end. ae is His individual self. He is per-
fection yet He has perfect states. The necessity in God is the 
necessary existence of some instance, some perfect state. What 
this state will be 1s oorrelated to the ongoing state or the uni-
verse and thererore contingent. To use but one example, God's 
actual knowledge includes whatever exists and has existed in the 
universe. As more things come into the world, God's knowledge 
increases in a corresponding manner. He attains a state of g~ 
er actualization. God, as modal coincidence, necessarily knows 
4lIbid., pp. 63-64. 
42~., p. 65. 
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whatever is actual as actual and whatever is possible as possible 
The content of this necessary knowledge is contingent. In God: 
perfection has two aspects, the absolute aspect, A, which 
cannot be surpassed in any way whatever, and the transcen-
dentally relative aspect, or the aspect of transcendent 
relativity, R, which is surpassable only by the perfect 
itself, not by any other individual. Or better, and pos-
itively: as At God surpasses all things save only Himself; 
as R, he surpasses all things, including Himselt. 43 
God coincides with the property Upertection. " That a perfect in-
dividual exists is necessary. The property and its existence are 
both on the same logical level of necessity. Which particular 
state of the individual exists is contingent. ~le property-in-
stance distinction is kept intact; the logical-type objection is 
overoome.44 Though kept intact. the distinction applies to indi-
vidual and state. not individual and class property. God's per-
fection is 'fa class of similar and genetically related statea of 
one individual. tt45 
'rbe classical definition ot perfection allows tor actual-
ity alone. It provides tor no distinction between property and 
instance. Hence, it cannot withstand the logical-type objection 
proposed by Carnap and. others. Only the neoclassical definition 
with its admission of potentiality as well as actuality in God 
C&l bear the onslaught of the powerful objection. If the Anselm-
ian argument is to prove the existenoe ot God t the classical def'i~ 
43Ib1d., p. 67. 
44Ib1d • 
-45Ibid• 
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nit ion of perfection must cede to the neoclassical. "Anselm vas 
right ••• except ••• that he had no remedy. and coulj have none, for 
the Logical-type difficulty and other antinomies in the classical 
idea. Here was his sole essential mistake.,,46 Since the solu-
tion of the logical-type objection involves a necessary eXistent, 
a lull refutation or this objection also includes the refutation 
of the law of modern logic that all existential statements are 
contingent. The law will be refuted, it it can be shown that at 
least one propOSition does not co.e under it. This can be done 
by establishing the criteria for oontingency and seeing if oontin 
gency applies to the proposition "perfeotion exists." Hartshorne 
proposes, as the foundation of his major proof, ten marks of con-
tingency. 1'h8 contingent indiTidual is such that it: 
(1) 
(2) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
By existing prevents some other things (otherwise pos-
sible) troQ 3xisting; 
Depends causally tor its existence upon some, but not 
all other individuals (thus upon those (loming before 
but not after it in ti.me); 
Could conceivably be known to Gxist by some impe~toct 
minds and by Pertect Mind (it this be itselt conceiv-
able). and it could also conceivably be known not to 
exist; 
Depends, tor the details of its actual qualities, upon 
so.e other eXisting things (this qualitative dependence 
not being limited to thing(as in <2~ without which it 
could not exist); 
Is i~selt a causs requirGd tor the existonce or. so~e 
other things; 
Inoludes in it as ~ctuality the actuality of some other 
things as parts or constituents (in a very general 
sense). and its potontial states inolude soma ot -the 
unrealized possibilities or the universe; 
Falla l:fithin som3 quantitative and 'lutllitativo limits 
essential to its individual identity. including limits 
3.8 to number and kind ot parts. 
46 Ibid., p. 83. 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
Has, or can be oonceived to have, a beginning at some 
time and an ending at some time; 
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Can be defined or identified as an Individu~l only em-
pirically, a.nd only by some other individuals (not,for 
instance, by those entirely before it 1n time), rather 
than ~~iversally or by mere unlv8rsal concepts; 
Is "good" for some legitimate purposes only. 47 
None of the above criteria of oontingency apply to the proposi-
tion "perfection exists." 
Thougb God in the concrete exemplification ot his ab-
stract essence does have contingency, He by no means is contin-
gent in His individual selt. Contingency entails arbitrariness 
and exclusiveness. The contingent being &ay either be or not be; 
it may have these qualities or those; but, granted that it exists 
its concept and existence exclude the existence ot incompatible 
beings and demands the existence of compatible ones. The exi8-
tence ot men demands the existence ot air, sufficient warmth, and 
nourishment. The proposition "a san exists- is not compatible 
with the proposition "nitrogen 1s the only gas in the universe." 
Both propositions are contingent and mutually exclusive. Necas-
aar" propositions stand with any conSistent, positive statement. 
The proposition "perfection exists" is one such statement. As 
Hartshorne puts it: 
I hold that the existence of perfection is compatible with 
a.n;y oth~r sort of existence v/hatever. The perfect sho~'1s 
its superiority precisely in thiS, bhat it can maintain it-
self regardless of wb.llt else does., or does not., maint"lin 1 t-
selt. It can tolerate or endure any stat9 of af'.t'airs what-
soever. 48 
4?Ibid., pp. 74-75. 
48 Ibid., p. 68. 
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God may, ot course, by His own tree action exclude innumerable 
things. By itself t however .. His existence oann.,:>-4; btt prevented 
nor can it prevent anything else trom existing, "because it does 
not depend upon any other state ot affairs or conflict with any. 
God's creative nature precludes His solitary existence, to be 
sure; but His mere existence remains independent ot outside in-
fluences. In regard to the tirst criterion, the major one of ex-
clusiveness, it may be said that each contingent concept specit~~ 
excludes, or restricts some positive possibility. But the con-
cept ot perfection does not. Theretore it i8 either neceasarl17 
exemplified or impossible. Since it is not selt-contradictor.1, 
it must be exemplitied. The only question remaining 1s whether 
men have rational knowledge or just teel that God exists. Thus 
runs the argument from universal existential tolerance.49 
A common way of discovering the truth or falsity of a 
statement is to conoeive or to find a state ot affairs that would 
contradict the statement. A sta.tement that cannot be conceived 
to have a contradiction will not be impossible. The proposition 
"perfection exists" is such a atatement. B.y detinition, God has 
pertect knowledge. Only nothing escapes it. There is only one 
"thing" God does not and cannot know--Hls own non-existenoe. 
Since the perfect mind cannot know its own non-existence much 
less can the imperfect human mind know it. H'~ans could know it 
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only by knowing something that would make its existence impossi-
ble. But there is no state of affairs that humans could thus 
know. beca.use there is no state of arrairH incom.!>a.tible with God's 
existence. 5O God cannot be conceived no~ to exist. 
Furthermore. the possibility ot Bis existenc. can be con-
ceived. The perfect mind would certainly know its own existence. 
The human mind implicitly knows the existence ot the divine being 
To know is to know something. But everything depends upon God 
tor existence. Whereas it is possible to know the truth of the 
propOSition "perfection exists", it ia impossible to know its tal 
atty. Perrection can have only necessary existence or no sense 
at all. In the latter case no judgment can be made, so the tor-
mer must be true. 51 "A thousand scholars, relying on their prade 
cessors or contemporaries to have looked into the matter with due 
care may say otherwise; but the logical relations ot concepts are 
what they are, not 'Ilhat they are !lald to be. "52 !bus the th1rd 
criterion does not apply. The epiatemle proof rules it out. 
Every being, both actual and past, becomes part or God's 
knowledge and valua.tions. In order to know these beings which 
continually spring trom the divine creatiVity, God must come a~­
ter each ot these belngs--a condition that necessarily requires 
God to be everlasting, thus ma.king His non-existence impossible.54 
50 Ibid., p. 71. 
51I~i4. , p. 72. 
52Ibid• , p. 73. 
53!!2!.!!. , p. 80. 
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In neoclassical metaph7sics the ideal ot perpetual creation is 
never realized, "since the possibilities open to divine and non-
divine creativity are absolutely infinite, and their exhaust1ve 
actualization is selt-contradictor,y_"54 Both God and the uni-
verse continue to develop_ The tourth criterion, then, d088 not 
apply. Beings can ultimately result only trom God's creative ac-
tion. Theretore, all things, not merely some arbitrary number 
have Him as their cause. Without Him notbing would exist. Thus, 
the tilth criterion does not apply. By definition God's actual-
ity is coextensive with the actuality ot all things and His pos-
s1bility with the possibility ot all things. Thus the sixth cri-
terion tails to apply. The only limit on God's knowledge and 
valuations is the present state ot the world. There is no cap or 
top put upon His creatiVity. His individual identity is absolute 
ly illimited. Thus the seventh criterion tails to apply. God c~ 
not be conceived to have either a beginning or an end, otherwise 
Be would not be the modal COincidence ot actuality and possibil-
ity. Thus the eighth criterion tails to app17_ God is the sole 
individual who can be recogD1zed as an individual through the col· 
leotion ot universal terms. ae i8 unique, not a member ot a 
class. No epiatealc relation 18 required tor His individuation. 
Thus the ninth criterion tails to app17. God is good for all le-
g1timate purposes. To think of His non-existence serves no pur-
pose at allt hence, it is unthinkable. !hus the tenth criterion 
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fails to apply.55 The convergence ot all the criteria present a 
most powerful argument on behalf of the Anselmian principle. 
From the above, the refutation of the positivists readily 
tollows. The positivists have the dilemma: ItGod cannot exist 
contingently, tor contingency of existence is an imperfection; 
but also God cannot exist necessarily, for the necessary is ab-
stract Rod inactual, the mere common factor ot possibility.tt56 
They are unable to solve the dilemma, and hence, decide that the 
idea of' God can have no cognitive meaninp:. Men might feel in 
their hearts that God exists but they cannot prove His existence 
through rational argumentation. An immediate argument against 
the positivists is that millions of people in the past and pres-
ent believe the idea ot God 1s significant. Yet this will not 
suttice. Hartshorne resolves the problem by distinguishing be-
tween classical and neoclassical views of God. The classical 
view is so fraught with logical antinomies that it cannot be used 
to solve the dilemma. The neoclassical view, however, with ita 
distinction between the divine individuality and its concrete em-
bodiment in genetically related, contingent states can be admira-
bly used in eliminating the crucial second horn of the dilemma. 57 
Necessity is often spoken of as pertaining to the rela-
tionship between concepts,and not between concepts and a pgrticu-
55Ibid., pp. 8D-81. 
56 Ibid., p. 114. 
-
57Ibid • 
-
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lar individual. The statements so tar made about God, however, 
are abstract. The relations are solely between concepts; hence, 
a necessary connection between them can be made. "Necessity can 
perfectly well relate the concept 'pertection' to the concept 
'necessarily exemplified property.' And this is exactly Anselm's 
PrinciPle.,,58 God io not an ordinary, limited, pa1~icular indi-
vidual; He is the unique, absolutely unlimited individual. There 
is a distinction between His individual abstract esse.nce and its 
necessary exemplification in concrete, particular, genetically re 
lated states. "That He exists is non-particular; only ~ He ex-
ists, or in what state, is exclusive or particular.»59 The truth 
of the necessary relations 1s consequent upon the very definition 
ot neoclassical pertection. "The necessity of the existence of 
perfection 1s s1mpl~ that a 'predicate so general that any possi-
ble state of affairs wouln embody itt is necessarily embodied, 
and this is analytle.»60 On two accounts the positivists are de-
teated. The necessity ot God's existence is rendered logical and 
the meaning of the concept is rendered significant. The exis-
tence ot God or perfection is neither mea.ningless nor inconsis-
tent. 
These, then, are the theories of Malcolm and Hartshorne 
on Anselm's ontological argument tor the existence of God. It 
only remains to evaluate tbem. 
58Ib1d., p. 92. 
59Ib1d., p. 93. 
60Ib1d• 
CHAPTER IV 
A CRITIQUE OF MALCOLM'S AND HARTSHORNE' 8 POSITIONS 
Both Malcolm and Hartshorne maintain that Anselm has two 
arguments in tl)e Proslogion; one trom contingent existence and 
one trom necessary existence. In both arguments the starting 
point is "a being a greater than which cannot be thought." It it 
can be shown that Anselm never attributes anything but necessar,r 
existence to this being, Malcolm and Hartshorne will be proven 
wrong. The discu8sion, then, centers around the meaning ot the 
phrase "a being a greater than which cannot be thought." 
The common note in the various equivalents to the most 
frequent tormulation and in the tormula itselt i8 the comparative 
tara at the adjective "great." Ooupled with the words "nothing 
••• than" tne comparative "greater" has superlative f'oree. Indeed 
this i8 Anselm's intention; tor, when he speaks ot God whom, con-
trary to Gaunilo's view, he ldentities as the "being a greater 
than which cannot be thought, ft he reters to Him only with super-
latives. In arguing to the existence of' God trom an analYSis at 
good things in the world, Anselm concludes to a good that exists 
and is good through itselt and through wbich all other goods are 
good. A good preeminent over all others is a supreme good. "But 
that which is supremely good 1s also supremely great. nl "And 
Inonologion, cb. 2, p. 40. The pertinent Latin reference 
6Q 
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since there can be nothing supremely great except what is supreme 
1,. good, there must be a being that is greatest and best. 1.e., 
the highest ot all existing beings."2 Whatever is great is great 
through this being "which 1s great through itselt.,,3 This being 
exists through itself while all other beings exist through it; 
consequently, a comparison can be made between the beings. An-
selm makes the comparison saying; 
whatever exists through another is less than that, through 
which all things are and which alone exists through itself. 
theretore, that which exists through itself exists in the 
greatest degree of all things. 
There is, then, some one being which alone exists in 
the greatest and highest degree ot all. 4 
Furthermore, "that which is greatest of all ••• must be supremely 
good, and supremely great, and the highest of all existing be-
ings.,,5 At this point is added in the Schmitt edition but not in 
the Deane translation: "Therefore, there is something which, whe-
ther it be called as essence or a substance or a nature, is the 
best and greatest and highest being of all.,,6 This being more-
tor this and the following quotations is given to highlight the 
cogency ot the argumentation. This reference is: "summe magnum," 
I, p. 15, 1. 11. 
2Ibid., pp. 40-41; " ••• summe magnum ••• maximum ••• id est 
summe omnIum," I, p. 15, 11. 21-22. 
'Ibid., p. 40; "quod magnum est per seipsum," I, p. 15, 
11. 18-19-:--
4Ibid., ch. 3, p. 42; ft ••• minus ••• maxime omnium est •••• 
solum maxIii"'""et summe omnium est," I, p. 16, 11. 20-23. 
5Ibid., pp. 42-43; " ••• maxima omnium est ••• samme bonum et 
summe magnum, et summum omnium quae aunt." I, p. 16, 11. 23-26. 
6Ibid.~, "Quare est aliquid, quod, sive essentia sive sub-
stantia s~ntvura dicatur, optimum et maximum est at summum om-
nium quae sunt;" It p. 16, 11. 26-28. 
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over, is "the supreme good being, the supreme great being, being 
or subSisting as supreme, that is, the highest of all existing 
beings. 1t7 Bow has Anselm used the word "great" thus tar? He 
has used it as an ordinary adjective, as an ordinary adjeotive 
modified by the superlative adverb "supremely," as a superlative 
adjective, and as a superlative adverb modIfying the verb "is." 
That being whioh is supremely great is said to be the one and 
only being which is the greatest being, the being which exists in 
the greatest degree ot existence. In all oases "great" reters to 
absolute exoellenoe. By "great," Anselm does not "mean physioal-
ly great, as a material object is great, but that which, the 
greater it is, is the better or the more wortby--wisdom, tor in-
stance. ,,8 
The being whioh exists in the highest degree is that be-
ing which has existenoe through itselt. It is not caused, either 
etticiently, materially, or tormally. It is the uncaused being, 
which oauses all that is. Such a being cannot come into existenc~; 
tor it has no beginning. Suoh a being i8 not composite. "Every-
thing which is oomposite requires tor its subsistenoe the things 
of whioh it is oompounded, and, indeed, owes to them the tact of 
its existenoe, beoause, whatever it i$, it is through tbese 
th1ngs.,,9 This being bas no oauses; it is simple. Being Simple, 
7Ib1d. t oh. 4, p. 45; .. summum bonum t summum magnum, sum-
mum ens s~ Bubaistens t 1d est summum omn1 um quae aunt," It p. 
18, 11. 3-4. 
a Ibid., ah. 2, p. 40. 
9Ibid., ah. 17. p. 67. 
-
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it cannot corrupt; being incorruptible, it cannot go out of exis-
tence. Such a being has no end. A being which is and can have 
neither beginning nor end is a necessary being. 
When assigning names to God Anselm makes it very clear 
that "nothing that is truly said ot' the supreme Being is accepted 
1n terms of quality or quantity, but only 1n terms of ~ it 
is."10 !he simple pertections Anselm lists such as truth, power, 
wisdom, life. beins, and justice, in naming God refer only to His 
essence, and in two special ways. Firat, it any name is applied 
to both the supreme Being and creatures "doubtless a very ditfer-
ent signitieation ot that name 1s to be understood in its oass.,,11 
Secondly, "whatever it 1s essentially in any way, this is all of 
wha't 1t 1s, ,,12 so that "this Essenoe 1s always, in every way, sub 
stantially identical with itself.,,13 The identifioation of its~ 
with itself means that all of the names reter to one and the same 
thing, although the intelligibilities of the names are different. 
To reter to a suprem3ly great being is to reter to the same being 
Anselm calls eternal and supremely living. Life as an attribute 
ot the supremely great being means eternal 11te. lite in which 
there is no beginning, no end, not even a present as understood 
in human terms. It is ·totally itself all at once. Wherefore, 
lOIbid. 
-11 Ibid. , 
-
ch. 26. p. 86. 
l2Ibid., ch. l? p. 67. 
13Ibid •• ch. 25. p. 85. 
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since for the supreme Being, "it is the same to exist and to live 
no better sense can be attache(l to this statement, than that it 
exists or 11v~s eternally, that is, it possesses interminable 
life, as a perfect whole at once.,,14 Such a being, indeed, is a 
necessary beinJ'. 
Thus far the argumentation has been restricted to the 
Monologion; but the same conclusion applies to the Proslogion and 
..A.nsalm·~ ApologetiC as wall. In the Proalogion God, the "being a. 
greater than wllich cannot be thought, It is still that being , ... hich 
"alone exists through itself and creates all other things trom 
nothlng,,,15 which "alone among all beings not only do~~ not essse 
to be, but also dC:~~,H~: not begin to be .. rtl6 which alone "is, an a 
whole, at the same time ever.r~here,"17 which is the life whereby 
it lives, the wisdom whereby it 1s wise, the goodn~ss whereby it 
is gOOd. 18 And in Anselm's ApologetiC, Anselm makes it clear tha 
he has deliberately chosen the formula "a being a greater than 
which cannot be thought" rather than the formula "a being a great 
er than which cannot be understood."l9 This being is that being 
~hich has all the perfections it is better to have than not to 
have. "Hence, when a being than which a greater is inconceivable 
l4Ibid., ch. 24, p. 83. 
15ProBlogiO~, ch. 5. p. 10. 
l6Ibid •• ah. 13, p. 20. 
17Ibid. 
l8Ibid., ch. 12, p. 19. 
19Anselmts ApologetiC, ch. 5, p. 162. 
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is conceived, if it is a being whose non-existence is possible 
that is conceived, it is not a being than which a greater cannot 
be conoeived. n20 Nowhere does Anselm argue from any existence 
other than necessar7 existence. This is Anselm's point. The 
person who real17 understands that "God is that being than which 
a greater cannot be oonceived ••• assuredly understands that this 
being so truly exists, that not even in conoept oan it be non-
existent. ,,21 B.7 means ot his formula Anselm has presented a 
structure in which all the conoeptua1 content applicable to God 
can be placed. 
After Malcolm and Hartshorne pOinted out two arguments 
for the existence of God in the Proslogion, critios Y. J. Hug-
gett,22 Raziel Abelson,23 and Terence Penelhum24 also mentioned 
them. In pointing out the arguments, Malcolm said that they are 
argument:s which Anselm "did not distinguish trom one another,,25 
and for which "there is no evidence that he thought of himself as 
offering t,,,o different proofs. It26 It is surprising, then, that 
2OIbid., ch. 9, p. 169. 
21Prosloslon, ch. 5, p. 10. 
22W. J. Huggett, "The Nonexistence of Ontological Argu-
ments, tl Philosophical Review, LXXI (June, 1962), p. 377. 
23hziel Abelson. "Not Necessarily, It Philosophioal Re-
view, LXX (January, 1961), pp. 6?-68. -
24Terence Penelhum "On the Second Ontological Argument," 
Philosophical Review, LXX ~January, 1961), pp. 85-86. 
25Malcolm, ~. g!!., p. 41. 
26Ibid., p. 45. 
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Malcolm still maintains that there are two distinct arguments. 
One may naturally ask why Malcolm does this. The reason Malcolm, 
Hartshorne, and the others distinguish the arguments is that they 
do not understand Anselm's thought on this point. On the basis 
ot the evidence presented above showing that Anselm only thought 
of God as necessarily existing, it is here submitted that the 
reason why Anselm did not distinguish two different proofs for 
the existence of God and why he did not think of himself as dis-
tinguishing them is the fact that the "arguments" are the same. 
Regarding the second part of their argumentation it must 
be said that in so far as both Malcolm and Hartshorne argue from 
a concept ot a pertect being to the real existence of this being 
their arguments are similar and can be refuted with the same ob-
jection. But, since they develop in somewhat different manners 
their argument for the validity of the second torm ot the Anselm-
ian argument, each man will be treated separately. 
Malcolm's basic principle is that necessary existence is 
a property ot God, that the proposition "God neoessarily exists" 
by no means signifies "that it follows necessarily tram something 
that God exists contingently.,,2? He also desoribes God as being 
unlimited, independent, necessarily omniscient and omnipotent. 
All these statements Anselm would endorse. Malcolm, however, has 
tailed to clear the ambiguity in the propositions "God necessar-
ily existsrt and "It is necessary that God exints." Wherea.s the 
27 Ibid., p. 50. 
-
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former modality is predicated !t!. nt. the latter is predicated 1l! 
dicto. The two propositions are not intrinsically related by 
logical ties, because existence is not a real predicate. Exis-
tence is a logical or formal predicate, a second-level predicate. 
which can only be predicated of predicates not things.28 Nor can 
making the concept of' God a unique concept bridge the gap. "To 
proffer the uniqueness of the concept ot God as an intuitive 
ground tor the ontological argument is to abandon rules of logic 
tor the eye of faith,,,29 a faith which has tar more foundation 
than the argument. The ~ d1cto proposition may well be analyti-
cally true. A logically necessary truth, however, is not neoes-
sarily an ontological truth. Both Malcolm and Hartshorne main-
tain that "God necessarily exists" 1s an analytic proposition. 
The critics agree. That an analytic proposition automatically 
applies to the real world, however, is something Allen.'O Penel-
hum. 3l Plantlnga,32 and Pike33 deny. According to Penelhum and 
Plantings, the proposition "God necessarily exists" springs from 
Revie'o1f, 
28 Abelson, 22- ~-, p. 70. 
29R_ E. Allen, "The Ontological Argument," Philosophical 
LXX (January, 1961), p. 59. 
30 Ibid., p. 57. 
-31 Penelhum, 22. ~., p. 91. 
32Alvin Plantlgna, "A Valid Ontological Argument," The 
Philosophical Review. LXI (January, 1961), p. 101. ---
33Nelson Pike, ReView of The Lo~iC of Perfection and Oth-
er E$SIiS !a ~eoclasslcal Meta¥Bfsics,y Cnarles Hartsnorne,---
!he Ph osoph1cal RevIew, LXXI April, 1963), p. 268. 
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religious sentiment, not from experiential evidence; according to 
Allen, existence is not .'il predicate; according t·) Pike, the jump 
from statements to beings is illicit. 
Raziel Abelson goes ~ step further. 1'i!J.lcolm attests that 
the propositions It'God is the greatest of all beings,' 'God is 
the most perfect belng,' 'God is the 'supreme being',' are logic-
sIll necessary truths, in the same sense that the statement 'A 
square has four sides' is a logically uec98sary truth. ,,34 When 
Malcolm equates the two typellJ of pro:posltions, Abelson claims he 
also equates the verbs in each ot the propositions. Existence, 
however, as it is used in mathematical equations is such that its 
elimination only leads to inconvenient notation. The con'tent re-
mains unchanged. The elimination of existence in Malcolm' s for-
mulation, on the other hand, is far trom trivial. 35 Malcolm also 
seems to view both theology and mathematics as deductive systems. 
Oertainly mathematics is a deductive system; 7et its deductions 
are based upon postulates, one of wbich must be existential in 
order to avoid a vacuous system and a system in which existence 
is never solely based upon a definition. Postulating the exis-
tence of God in any meaningful sense is beggin9; the question. 36 
Malcolm merely concludes to what he bas already assumed. His 
formulations would apply to any necessary being or beings wbat-
34Malcolmt ~. 2!1., p. 45. 
35Abelson, 2£.~., p. 71. 
36 Ibid., p. 72. 
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ever. A necessary being necessarily exists, is necessarily omni-
potent, necessarily independent, necessarily unlimited--all ot 
these statements and any others that may be made about a neces-
sary being are by definition admittedly true; but none of this 
by itself proves the real existence of any necessary being. "It 
merely describes any that may exist.,,3? The only reason tor be-
lieving in the existence ot the necessary being is the use of the 
proper noun "God." 'Since proper names usually or always imply or 
presuppose existence, it is easy to slide into the beliet that 
what has been named exists, and this is particularly easy when 
the entity in question is described in terms of existence. n38 
The use of a proper name, however, proves nothing. 39 
Hartshorne has four main points: that God is a unique, 
absolutely unlimited individual, that Be is defined as the modal 
coincidence ot all actuality and possibility, that the argument 
has an irreducible modal structure, that the notion ot God·s ne-
cessary existence has not only emotional but also cognitional 
foundation. His system stands or falls with his definition ot 
God, because it is on the basis ot the abstract-concrete distinc-
tion that he handles the logical-type objection, the most power-
ful objection in his opinion to his argumentation. But his deti-
nition is as fraught with antinomies as he claims the classical 
3?Paul Henle, "Uses at the Ontological Argument," The 
Philosophical Review, LXX (January, 1961), p. 106. ---
}8Ibid. 
39 Allen, ~. cit., p. 61. 
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idea to be. For instance, he maintains that to love is to care 
for individuals;40 yet how could God care for, provide tor indi-
viduals in a meaningful way without foreknowledge? He maintains 
that God cannot depend upon anything for His existence; yet he 
also says God cannot exist alone.4l Further investigation of 
this matter is unnecessary; because, even granting his definition 
ot God, his position can be retuted. 
Hartshorne is correct in claiming that Kant missed the 
significance of Anselm's argumentation. God is a necessary being 
with necessary not contingent existence. The structure of An-
selm t s argument is undeniably mod.al. The necessary existence of 
something eliminates any possibility of its non-existence, should 
it exist, and any possibility of its existence should it not 
exist. Modality, in other worda, is tolerant of only one alter-
native. HartShorne's use of the modal argument, however, has a 
fatal weakness. The crucial steps in his ten-step, partial for-
mulation of the mature form of the argument are six, seven, and 
eight. 42 In six, he states that a pertect Being is either neces-
sarily existent or necessarily non-existent; in seven, that it is 
not necessarily non-existent; and therefore, in eight, that it is 
necessarily existent. The proposition that it is not necessari17 
non-existent is equivalent to the proposition that God's exis-
4%artshorne, ~. ill. t p. 36. 
41lli9,., p. 80. 
42Murel R. Vogel S.J., Review of The ~eg of Perfection 
and Other Essaxs in Neociassical Metaphysi~ arres Hart- • 
i1iOrne. The Dew Scno~as'tlc1sm. .x:xxv~~~. .3 l July. 1964). 'D. 411. 
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tence is not impossible. In saying that God's existence is not 
impossible, Hartshorne can mean that the notion of God's exis-
tence contains no contradiction or else that whether it does or 
not is uncertain. If he means that it is uncertain, the argument 
as a whole cannot conclude with certainty that God exists in real 
ity with necessary existence. He cannot mean that the notion of 
God's existence contains no contradiction, because he has insulti 
cient knowledge of it.43 The seventh step tollows as an intui-
tion trom the conclusions ot arguments ~ aliunde. "But (7) is 
neither an intuition or knowable until we have already proved 
that God exists.,,44 The mere concept ot a perfect being is no 
proof for the possibility or impossibility of the real existence 
of its content. Not knowing whether or not the notion of God's 
existence is self-contradictor.1, Hartshorne cannot reach a posi-
tive conclusion about God's real existence. This line of criti-
ciam applies to Malcolm as well as to Hartshorne. Whereas Hart-
shorne does not present a proof that the notion ot God's neces-
sary existence is not self-contradictory, Malcolm not only as-
sumes the notion is not selt-contradictory he also maintains that 
he cannot prove his contention and that furthermore a proof is 
not required. 45 In defense he draws an analogy. Be does not 
43JOhn O. Nelson, "Modal Logic and the Ontological Proo! 
for God·s Existence," ~ Review .2! Metaphzsics, XVII, 2 (Decem-
ber, 1963), p. 236. 
44 Vogel, .2l!. ill,. 
45 Malcolm, ~. £!i., p. 60. 
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know how to demonstrate the self-consistency of the concept ot a 
material being nor of seeing a material being. Some philosophers 
argue that these concepts are self-contradictory, while others 
maintain that they are not. No demonstration, acceptable to all, 
exists; yet, these concepts, like the concept of God, play an 
important role in human lite. 
Hartshorne's lengthy inquiry into the criteria for con-
tingency is both interesting and enlightening. Untortunately, 
his application of the criteria of contingent beings to contin-
gent statements and by contrast to necessary statements and the 
concept ot God does not prove the real existence ot the object of 
the concept. "The switch trom talking about contingent belngs 
(which are, for example, dependent beings), to talking about con-
tingent jU4s!ents or statements, renders the central theme ob-
scure to the point of being opaque,H46 and invalidating the argu-
ment. But, even if the statement Ifperfection exists" is one ot 
the existential judgments not exhibiting any of the ten oontin-
genoy criteria listed by Hartshorne, still the statement would 
not conclusively prove the real existence of such a being. For 
"the concept of a Perfect Being would not prove its real exis-
tence unless its non-existenoe were inconoeivable. n4? God, the 
Pertect Being even as described by Hartsborne, oan be thought ot 
as non-existent. Moreover, even granted that a Perfect Being 
does exist and necessarily exists, men would not know this fact 
46.P1ke, .sm.. ill,., p. 268. 
4?Vogel, 22. 2!!., p. 410. 
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as self-evident. "No analysis ot the concept of Perfeot Being 
will aver yield knowledge of any actual existence except the exls~ 
tence of the conoept in our mind. r.48 
The idea of God, as Hartshorne asserts against the posi-
tivists, has a cognitional and not merely an emotional oontent 
and foundation. Hartshorne uses his abstraot-concrete distinc-
tion to overcome the positivists. The difficulty with dOing this 
is that ontological possibility is given priority over actuality. 
As Blackwell notes, possibility is consequent upon actuality.49 
God is the repository of all possibilities because He is in act 
and has infinite power for action. Whether the classical or the 
neo-classical concept of God be used, its automatic application 
to the real order is invalid. Statements made about God may be 
necessary statemen~s. nPropositions have their own ·being.' whe-
thor they are necessary or contingent notwithstanding; but this 
is not the being of actual entities. lt50 Necessity in hum.an know-
ledge does not necessarily impose necessity upon God. In other 
words, real existenoe must be proved from other sources than the 
concept. The proposition "God exists" is, indeed. self-evident 
to God, but not to humans who see Him only through an lIunclear 
glass. tf 
• 
48 Ibid., p. 411. 
49Ricbard J. Blackwell. Review of The Logic ot Perfection 
and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaihysi~ hy Onar!es Hart-
shame. The ModernSchoo!iiian, XLI. 4 ~May, 1964), 388. 
-
50Julian Hartt, ttThe Lo6io of Pertection,tf The Review ot 
MetaphysicaL XVI, 4 (June, 196~). p. 755. --- --
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The source of the cognitional element in the concept of 
God must be clarified, if A ... '"lselm' s argumentation is to be under-
stood. Hartshorne I;laintains that this definition of God, like 
Ansa:m's, is entirely a priori;;l and consequently his inferenoe 
from it 1s B priori. Is this so? "Upon the existence of the 
Perfect,n he says, "all other things must depend ••• hence its non-
existence would mean that nothing was even possible, which is 
absurd.,,52 How does he knowa.bout this dependence? The answer 
seems to be found in an analysis of experience. An ana.lysis of 
experience even yields a knowledge of God's existence; tor itim_ 
plicltly everyone knows (or at least feels) the divine exis-
tence. a ;3 Ma.lcolm holda that An~elm's proof' is valid provided 
both the propositiions "God necessarily exists" and "God exists U 
are understood as a priori propositions so that the tormer en-
tails the latter, thus making the two statements equiValent. 54 
Even though he considers these propositions and Anselm's formula-
tion a priori, he is convinced that Itthere cannot be a deep un-
derstanding ot that concept wi't;hout an unders'canding of the phe-
nomenon at human life that gave rise to it.!!5; He retrains trom. 
explioating the origin at length, suggesting only the phenomenon 
51Hartshorne, ~. £!l., p. ". 
52Ibid., p. 80. 
53Ibid., p. 110. 
-
54Maloolm, .2l2. ~., p. 50. 
55r l;lid., p. 60. 
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of guilt. Men are weighed down under the pressure or a tremen-
dous guilt. while at the same time desiring with all their might 
that this weight be removed. The guilt is boundless; so bound-
less must be the mercy that moves it away. The merciful, unlimi-
ted God. therefore, must be postulated. 56 In other words. the 
argument has an experiential basis. The concept of God is formed 
through an examination and development of the meaning of empiri-
oal data. 
Henry W'olz argues that the whole first chapter of the 
Proslogion, the introductory prayer. provides the empIrical basis 
of the argument tor the existence o.t God. 'When Anselm says, "I 
sought calm in privacy, and I found tribU8tion and grief, in my 
inmost thoughts. I wished to smile in the joy of my mind, and I 
am compelled to frown by the sorrow at my heart,"'? he gives ut-
terance to the fate ot men. Th~y glory in their intellect, in 
the power or this tremendous faculty; yet this same intellect 
forces them to know that their desires will remain unfulfilled, 
that their life is doomed to frustration unless a loving God sat-
isfies their cravings. Prayer itself is a recognition of imper-
fection and dependence. And a recognition ot imperfection is si-
multaneously a recognition of perfection; because the imperfect 
is only known as such in the light of the perfect, the finite, in 
the ligbt of the infinite. The proofs in the Monologion are all 
56Ibld., pp. 60-61. 
5?Proslosion, ch. 1, p. 5. 
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the same in the sense that they posit a unity before all multi-
plicity, the existence of one being which is through itself and 
through which everything that is is what it is. Beings posses-
sing an attribute in a greater or less degree have it through a 
being which baa it in a perfect degree. The idea ot a perfect 
being is a necessary condition ot knowledge, whereby men know 
contingent reality. Without it men could not jUdge. 58 Yet men 
do judge. They judge that they are imperfect, an overwhelmingly 
undeniable tact. It they could be wrong in this judgment, they 
could not know anything. Everything would be unintelligible. 
But men have knowledge, so the world is intelligible; since the 
world is intelligible, there must be a being giving it intelligi-
bility. Such a theory is in accordance with Anselmts theory ot 
truth. Wolz, furthermore, asserts that the idea is vague. "It 
is true we cannot say ~ that perfect being is, but we know how 
it functions in human knowledge.,,59 Jor this reason it is best 
expressed in negative terms such 8S "a being a greater than which 
cannot be thought." 
This writer does not entirely agree with Wolz's position. 
I hold that Anselm develops his notion ot God. from a causal anal-
ysis of himself and other things in the world, and that his tor-
mulation ot God as Ha being a greater than which cannot be th~t' 
is a positive statement summarizing allot the attributes he 
58Henry G. Wolz, "The Empirical Basis ot Anselmts Argu-
ments," ~ Ph1loso~hical Review, LX (July, 1951), p. ;48. 
59Ibid ., p. 354. 
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lists in the Monologion and in the Proslosion. Anselm explicitly 
states in the last chapter of his reply to Gaunilo: 
I believe that I have shown by an argument which is 
not weak, but sufficiently cogent, that in my former book 
fProslogioru I proved the real existence ot a being than 
w~Ich a greater cannot be conceived; and I belIeve t~ 
nIs argument oannot be invalIdated by the validity of any 
objection. For so great force does the signification of 
this reasoning contain in itself, that this being which is 
the subject of disoussion. is of necessity. trom tne very-
faot that It-rs understood or conceived, proved also to 
exist in reality, and to be whatever we should believe ot 
the divine SUbstance. ~ \Jmpnasis miDi., --
-
The underlined sections of the passage just quoted show that the 
i'ormula Ita being than which a greater cannot be conceived" expres 
ses in capsule form "whatever we should believe of the divine 
substance. It Anselm treats "whatever we should believe of the di-
vine substance" in shortened torm in the Proslogion and at length 
in his earlier work, the Monologion. Once the formula has been 
well understood several things are known: God's existence and the 
attributes that oan be applied to Him. Anselm stresses a "sound 
understanding" of those things whioh a human can know about God. 
In the fourth chapter of the Proslogiont he distinguishes between 
conceiving of something according to the word signifying it and 
according to an understanding of the thing itself. Only the lat-
ter mode of conceiving God is acceptable in a proof of His exis-
tence. "God 1s that than which a greater cannot be conceived. 
And he who thoroughly understands this t assuredly understands 
that this being so truly exists. that not even in concept can it 
GOAnselmt§ ApologetiC, ch. lOt pp. 169-70. 
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be nonexistent. ,,61 The concept of a. being "a greater than which 
cannot be thought:' is not amorphous. It is worked out in some 
detail from an analysis of the world. Anselm aay:; that "nothing 
can be ascerta.ined concerning this Nature in terms of. its own 
peculiar character, but only in terms of something else,,62 and 
that it is Itevident to any ra.tional mind, that by ascending trom 
the lesser good to the greater, we can form a considerable notion 
ot a being than which a greater is inconce1vab1e. u63 The line ot 
reasoning stated in the second chapter of the ~oslogion is sim-
ple. because it assumes much that was done before. And this is 
consonant with Anselm's method; "tor his writings are related to 
one another in this way that the conclusion ot one work is car-
ried forward to become one of the premises of a later work. n64 
Only when the empirioal basis of the concept is kept in view can 
the concept be applied to reality; but, then, the inference is 
not an ontological inference from a purely a priori concept. 
11alcolm and Hartshorne would do well to tollow even more closely 
Anselm.'s lead. 
6lProslog1on, ch. 4, p. 10. 
62Moool0510n, ch. 66, p. 131. 
63Anselm 's Apologetic, ch. 8, p. 167. 
64John McIntyre, "Premises and Ooncluaion in the System 
of St. Anselm's Theology," SiiC11.~ium ieccense (Paria: Libraire 
Phi1osophiqu~ J. Vrin, 1959'. p. 9 • 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I. Primary Sources 
A. Books 
Anselm. S. Anselmi ~era Omnia. Edited by J'rancis S. Schmitt, 
0:8.1. 6 TO s. Vol. %; Sekau: Abbey Press, 1939. Vols. 
II-VII Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1946-61. 
Hartshorne. Charle.. !be Lo~iC ot Perteotlon and other Essa~s 1ll 
Neoclassical Mitap§is!c.:- fa DaIle, ITtInoIs: Openourt 
l~. 
B. Articles 
Hartshorne, Oharles. "Abstract and Ooncrete in God: A Reply," 
~ Review ot MetaPhYsiCS, XVII (December, 1963), pp. 
"28'9-95. -
I1alcolm, Norman. "Anselm's Ontological Arguments, It !he Ph110so-
Rhlcal Review, LXIX (January, 1960), pp. 4l-t;!'; 
II. Secondary Sources 
A. Books 
Allers, Rudolf. Mselm yon Canterbyrzl Leben, Lehre, Werke. 
Viennal Hegner, !93"6. 
Anselm. St. Anselm: Proslogium, MonoloSiwa, An Appendix in Bah.l" 
orthe Fool h GiunIlon, and Our DeuS-Homo. mired and 
traDala£ed Sy-Sldney lorto~ane.~ ea.; Ohicago: Open 
Oourt, 1935. 
Baeumker, Olemens. Witelo, E1n Philosoph und Naturtorscher des 
!iijh1eJ~h~t'!i2ite~~Iiii~g~.~urMg:~:¥;;~r.a::I~~:-
ohendorttschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1908. 
88 
89 
Barth, Karl. Anselm: Fides ~erens Int,llectum. Translated b~ 
Ian W. looertson. LOn on: Cameiot Press, Ltd., 1960. 
Combes, And~. Un Inedit de Saint Anselme? Paris: Librair1e 
Pb1losopEIque ~ • .rIn, 1944. 
Daniels, Augustinus, O.S.B. Geschichte d!r Gottesbewe1se 1m Drei-
zebnten Jahrhundert. (BeItraege zur Geschlchte dar-PhI-
losoph!e des Hlttelalters, VIII, 1-2.) Muenster: Aschen-
dorttsche Buehsverhandlung, 1909. 
De Remusat, Charles. Saint Anselme. Paris: Did1er at Cie., 1868 
Domet de Vorges. Saint Anselme. Paris: Felix Alean, 1901. 
Eadmer. The Lite ot St. Anselm. Edited with introduction, notes 
aiidtranslation bY Rlcliard W. Southern. London: Thomas 
Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1962. 
Filliatre, Charles. La Philosoph!e A! Sain~ Anselm.. Paris: 
Ffilix Alcan, I9'20. 
F1scher, Joseph. ])1 •• enntni81ebre AnSilms Von Canterbm. (Beitraege-ZUr seSiehte aer PhI osopbIi des Mite al-
ters, X, 3.) Muenster, i. w.: Asehendortfsehen Verlags-
buchhand1ung, 1911. 
Gilson, ](tienne, and Boehner, Phi1otheus. Gesehichte der Christ-
lichen Philosophie. Vol. II; 24 ed. rev.; Fiderborn:: 
FerdInand ~ehoenlngh, 1953. 
Grunwald, Georg. Geaehiehtl der Gotttsbeweise 1m Mlttelalter. 
~Beitraege zur dese iente dar P.&IlosophIi aer M!ttelalter 
VI, 3.) Muenster, Asehendortfsche Buchsverhandlung, 1907 
Henry, Desmond. The De Grammatico ot St. Anselm. Notre Dame: 
Uni versi tY'"'1Tiis, 1964. - -
Kolping, Adolf. Anselms Proslog10nbeweis der ExisteDz Gottea. 
1m zusammenhirf seInes s8eiUIativen-Prosramms "'ides QUaerens Inteectum." (renztragen zwIschen Theologi. 
una PhIlosophie, V!!I.) Bonn: Hanstein, 1939. 
I ICoyre, .Alexa.ndre. Lt Ide'e de Dieu dans 1£1 Philosoph1e de St. An-
selme. ParIs: fiJ:lit" 'tiroux, 1923". - - -
Labrouase, Roger. La Razon Z 1£1 Fe. Buenos .Aires: Editorial 
Yerba Buena-;-1C}45. - -
Marias, Julian. San Anselmo Z el Insensato. 2d ed.; Madrid: 
Revista d;-OccIdento, l~: 
90 
McIntyre, John. St. Anselm and His Oritics. Edinburgh. Oliver 
and Boyd,-r954. - - .• 
Phelan, Gerald. The Wisdom ot Saint Anselm. Latrobe, Pennsy~­
vania: St:-fincent IrCKabbey '~88, 1960. 
Plantinga, Alvin. ~ Ontological Arment. New York: DoubledaY' 
1965. 
Selections from Medieval Philosophers. Edited and translated by 
lielii'"rCr Mcleon. 2 "loIs. lew York: Oharles Scribner' 8 
Sons, 1929. 
Southern, Richard. St. Anselm and His B,ogaRher, A Stu<tt of 
Monastic :tti!, an! ThoUSnt: '""'Iiw or: bilibrIdge Uni ver-
sItY Press, 9~ 
S»lcilegium Deceanse. Oongres International du IXe Centenaire de 
I'lrrIv_e a'Anselme au Bee. Paris: Llbraire Pbilosoph~E 
J. Vrin, 1959. 
Stolz, A. Ansr::m von Oe.nterb~: Sein He~en, seine Bedeutunf' 
und ,e eliiiriitri:e. ~ueneli.n: oste! una Piistei .937. 
B. Articles 
Abelson, Haziel. "Not Necessarily," PhIlosophical Review, LXX (January, 1961), 67-84. 
Adlhoch, B. "Der Gottebeweis des heiligen Anselm," Phl1osoph1-
aches Jabrbucb, X, 4 (1897), 261-74, 394-416. 
Allen, R. E. "The Ontological Argument," Pb.l1osoRhical Review, 
LXX (January, 1961), 56-66. 
Antveiler, Anton. "Anselmus von Canterbur.Yt Monologion und Pr08-
logion," Scholastik. VIII (1933), 551-60. 
Bainvel. "Anselme," Dictionaire de Theolo!ie Oatho11gue. It Part 
2&. col. 1327 II. --
Bergentba1. I. "1at der 'Ontologisohe Gottesbewe1s' Anselma yon 
Oanterbury ein ~schluss?tt Pb1108oph1sches Jahrbuch, 
LXIX (1949), 155-68. 
C&PPU1DS, M. "L'argument de S. Anse1met" Richerohes .rut The'ololie 
aneienne at medievale, VI (1934), ~ 3-30. 
91 
Pind1ay, J. N. ·Oan God's Existence Be Disproved?" Mind, LVII 
(April, 1948), 176-83. 
Gilson, ~ienne. "Sens et nature de l'argument de saint Anselme. 
Archives d'Histoir! doctrinalo at 11tteraire du Moyen-ase n (19~), 5-51. - . - · OJ - - -
[Bartt, Julian. "!he :tagic of Perfect10n, II ~ Review .2! "etam-
sics, XVI, 4 (June, 1963), 750-69. 
-
lRenle, Paul. "Uses of the Ontological 4.rgwaent. If Philosophical 
Revie~, LXX (Januar.J, 1961), 102-09. 
H9nr.y, Desmond. "St. Anselm an~ Nothingness," T~e Philosophical 
quarterll. xv (July, 1965), 243-46. -
Huggett, W. J. nThe Nonexistence or Ontological Arguments," 
Philoso~hical Review, LXII (June, 1962), '77-79. 
~atthews, Gareth. "On Conceivability in Anselm and Malcolm," 
Philosophical Review, LXX (January, 1961), 110-11. 
Merton, Louis. "Reflections on go~e Recent Studies of St. An-
selm, ,t Monastic Studie." III (1965), 221-34. 
Miller, Robert, O.S.B. "!he Ontological Argument in St. Anselm 
and Descartes," The Modern SQhoolman, XXXII (May, 1955), 
341-349. ---
Motberwa7, Thomas. "St. Anselm, It The Modern Scboolman, XV (Hq, 
1938). ?9-8'41 -
Nelson, John O. "Modal Logic and the Ontological Proof for God's 
Existence," The Review ot Ket!Rhzsics, XVII, 2 (December, 
196'), 235-42. -
Penelhum, !erence. "On the Second ontologioal Argument," Philos-
2~hical Review, LXI (January, 1961), 85-92. 
Plantinga, Alvin. itA Valid Ontoloe;lcal Argument?" Philosophical 
Review, LXI (January, 1961), 93-101. 
Samuel, O. "Der onto1ogische Gottesbewels bei Karl Barth, Imman-
uel Kant und Anselm von Canterbury," Theoloe:ische B laet-
ter, XIV (1935), 141-53. 
~ ______ • "Ueber die Beweisbarkeit der Exlstenz Gottes: Konse-
quenzen des anse1mischen Bewelsverfabrens," Forscbungen (19 Gesch1chte und Lehre des Protestantismus, ttl, B 
,g). i::2i05. - • - . 
Spedalier1, F. "Anselmus a.n Gaunilo? Seu de recta argumenti 
sancti Doctoris interpretations," Gregorianum, XXVIII (1947), 55-77. 
• "De intrinseca argumenti S. Anse1t'li vi et natura," 
I----Gregorianum, XXIX (1948), 204-12. 
92 
Stolz, A. "Da.a Proslogion des hl. Anselm," Revue Benedictine, 
XLVII (1935), 331-47. 
~ ______ • tftVere esse' 1m Proslogion des heiligen Anselm," Schol 
astik, IX (1934), 400-09. 
V1gnaux, Paul. "Sens et Structure du Monologion," Revue des Sci-
ences Philosoph1gues !! Theologigues, XXXI tl941)~9~ 
~12. 
Wo1z, Henry G. "The Empirical Basis of Anselm's Arguments," 
Philosophical Review, LX (July, 1951), ;41-61. 
c. Book Reviews 
Blackwell, Riohard J. Review of ~ Logio of Perfection and 
Other Essays in Neoc1assiCiI Metap~iCSt by Oharles 
Hartshorne, .!!!! Hodern a<ihooliiian t , 4 (May, 1964), 
387-88. 
Pike, Nelson. Review of The Logic of Perfection and Other EsSHS 
in Neoclassical Met~¥isflS~bY Charles Hartshorne, Ph -
osophical nevIew, L pril, 1963), 266-69. ----
Vogel, Murel R., S.J. Review of The 10fic ot Perfection and 
Oth.er Essays in Neoclassical Me~Sica, '6y Charles Hart 
shome, 1hi New ~cholastlc!sm, X II, 3 (July, 1964). 
409-11. 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submi.tted by Mr. J. Allan Meyer, S.J. 
bas been read and approved by three members ot the 
Department ot Philosophy. 
The tinal copies have been examined by the director 
ot the the.is and the sicnature which appears below verities 
the tact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, 
and that the thesis is now given tinal approval with 
reterence to content, torm, and •• chanical accuracy. 
The thesis is theretore accepted 1n partial tultillment 
ot the requirements tor the negree ot Master ot Arts. 
